Essays on pension finance and dynamic asset allocation. by Dai, R.
Essays on Pension Finance
and Dynamic Asset Allocation
Proefschrift
ter verkrijging van de graad van doctor aan de Univer-
siteit van Tilburg, op gezag van de rector magniﬁcus,
prof.dr. Ph. Eijlander, in het openbaar te verdedigen
ten overstaan van een door het college voor promoties
aangewezen commissie in de aula van de Universiteit op
maandag 21 juni 2010 om 14.15 uur door
Renxiang Dai
geboren op 11 juni 1974 te Anhua, Hunan, China.Promotor: prof.dr. J.M. SchumacherTo my family.Acknowledgements
This thesis beneﬁted enormously from many people’s help and support in the three years
when this project was carried out. I would like to express my gratitude to some of them,
although the list of individuals I wish to thank would be beyond what this short text
could accommodate.
First of all, I thank Prof. Hans Schumacher for his enthusiastic supervision. Without
his guidance and support, the thesis as is presented here could not have been accom-
plished. What I have learnt from him, I believe, will be a valuable asset in my life.
I am grateful to the thesis committee members, Prof. Joost Driessen, Prof. Theo
Nijman, Dr. Juan Carlos Rodriguez, and Prof. Bas Werker, for their helpful comments
and suggestions. Their insight and wisdom helped greatly to improve upon the thesis.
This PhD project was supported by Netspar; I gratefully acknowledge its funding and
highly motivating research environment. During this project, I worked at the Department
of Econometrics and Operations Research, and I would like to thank all my colleagues
for this pleasant experience. The research facilities and support provided by the CentER
Graduate School and the CentER Finance Group are acknowledged with gratitude.
I would like to thank my friends and fellow PhD students at Tilburg University for
many memorable times we had together. They have helped greatly to make the three
years in the Netherlands enjoyable for my family and me. It is impossible to list their
names without omission, so I save the eﬀorts. My deep gratitude to them, however,
cannot be overestimated.
I am indebted to my parents and my extended family for their understanding and
support. The vast distance between us in those years was unable to stop me from receiving
and feeling their care and love.
To my wife, Yan, and my son, Molei, I would like to say thank you so much. Your
company made the years in Tilburg much more pleasant, and your understanding and
vvi




2 Welfare Analysis of Conditional Indexation Schemes from a Two-Reference-
Point Perspective 7
2.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2.2 The model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
2.2.1 The utility function . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
2.2.2 The ﬁnancial setting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
2.3 Pension investment for the benchmark utility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
2.4 Conditional indexation schemes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
2.4.1 The updating rules . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
2.4.2 The pension rights of the conditional indexation schemes . . . . . 23
2.5 Welfare analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
2.6 Concluding remarks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
2.A Appendix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
3 Valuation of Contingent Pension Liabilities and Implementation of Con-
ditional Indexation 39
3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
3.2 Consistent implementation and computational procedure . . . . . . . . . 43
3.2.1 The economy and the pension fund . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
3.2.2 Computational procedure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
3.3 Numerical illustration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
3.3.1 The impact of investment strategies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
3.3.2 The impact of policy ladders . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
3.4 Comparison to the proxy-based implementation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
viiviii Contents
3.5 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
4 Portfolio Choices and Consumption Smoothing under Time-variant Eq-
uity Premia and State Uncertainty 65
4.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
4.2 The investor’s decision problem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
4.3 The optimal strategy in the stable phase . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
4.4 Calibration and discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
4.4.1 Optimal investment and consumption policy . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
4.4.2 Implications for the beneﬁt policy of pension funds . . . . . . . . 81
4.4.3 Fixed-mix policies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
4.5 Conclusions and future work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
4.A Appendix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
5 Commodities in Dynamic Asset Allocation: Implications of Mean Re-
verting Commodity Prices 95
5.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
5.2 The economy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
5.3 Pure portfolio optimization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
5.3.1 Optimal wealth . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
5.3.2 Optimal portfolio plan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
5.3.3 The importance of commodities as an asset class: welfare analysis 111
5.4 Optimal portfolio and consumption decisions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113
5.4.1 Optimal wealth . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114
5.4.2 Optimal portfolio and consumption policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116
5.4.3 Welfare analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117
5.5 Calibration and discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118
5.5.1 Estimation of the commodity futures model . . . . . . . . . . . . 118
5.5.2 Optimal strategy and utility of commodity investment . . . . . . 120
5.6 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125
5.A Appendix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127
Bibliography 129Chapter 1
Introduction
In most countries, pensions are provided in two major forms: deﬁned beneﬁt (DB) and
deﬁned contribution (DC). Under DB pension schemes, the employee’s pension beneﬁt
is determined by a formula that takes into account such factors as years of service for
the employer and in most cases, wages or salary. Pension legislation often requires plan
sponsors to make good on these promises even if the underlying value of the pension
reserve falls short. Thus, pension sponsors, rather than pension plan participants, bear
pension investment and longevity risks. The aging population and the international move
towards the market-based accounting standard, however, have placed substantial funding
pressure on DB plans. As a consequence, the past two decades have seen a strong trend
away from DB plans toward deﬁned-contribution (DC) plans in many countries. Under
a typical DC plan, each participant has an individual retirement account into which the
participant and the sponsors (if any) make regular contributions. The retirement beneﬁt
then depends on the total contribution and investment earnings of the accumulation in
the account over time. In the case of DC plans, retirement saving and income tend to be
more subject to employees’ control throughout the life cycle, and hence it helps to relieve
employers and other sponsors of some, if not all, responsibility for pension provision under
the DB framework.
Many commentators seem to agree that the shift to DC plans, however, is far from
being a satisfactory solution because they are too complex and too risky for individuals.
Individuals typically lack the ﬁnancial expertise and computation capacities to implement
complex lifetime ﬁnancial planning. DC plans are also vulnerable to large marketing
and management costs, and to market failure like that stemming from adverse selection
in annuity markets. As a balance between DB and DC, an approach which has been
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implemented recently by many Dutch pension funds and which is under discussion in the
UK is to introduce a practice known as “conditional indexation”.
The way in which a conditional indexation scheme operates can be best illustrated by
an example. Let the ﬁnancial position of a pension fund be measured by its funding ratio,
i. e. the ratio of pension asset value to pension liability value. The level of compensation
for inﬂation (indexation) applied in a certain year is determined according to a rule of
the following form: (i) if the funding ratio is below some threshold (e. g. 110%), there is
no indexation to inﬂation; (ii) if the funding ratio is above some upper threshold (e. g.
140%), the pension rights will be fully indexed to inﬂation; (iii) if the ratio is in between,
some intermediate level of indexation will apply. The rule that links the funding ratio to
the indexation decision is referred to as a “policy ladder”. Several large pension funds in
the Netherlands have published such policy ladders.
From the perspective of participants, conditional indexation schemes are similar to
DB plans in the way beneﬁts are speciﬁed. From the perspective of pension funds,
conditional indexation brings a DC element as the liability value will generally change in
line with the development of the fund’s asset value through the practice of indexation,
therefore serving as a shield of the funding ratio against the ﬂuctuation of asset value
stemming from exposure to ﬁnancial markets. In a nutshell, conditional indexation, like
traditional DB, enables participants to enjoy a high level of pension predictability, and
like DC, enables pension funds to have a high level of ﬁnancial stability.
The introduction of conditional indexation may raise a number of issues, and in this
dissertation, Chapters 2 and 3 are devoted to address some of them. In Chapter 2, we
focus on the quality of pension proﬁle of conditional indexation schemes from a life-cycle
investment perspective, working under the assumption that participation in the scheme
is compulsory (as is the case in the Netherlands) so that in practice a ﬁnancial constraint
is imposed on participants. Welfare analysis is applied to investigate the performance
of such schemes relative to alternative investment strategies such as ﬁxed-mix policies.
We carry out this analysis in the context of a broad family of utility functions, which
takes into account the possible presence of two benchmark levels corresponding to a min-
imum guaranty and to full indexation respectively. For the purpose of comparability, we
construct a self-ﬁnancing continuous-time implementation of the conditional indexation
scheme. The implementation involves continual adjustment of the parameters of the con-
tingent claim representing ﬁnal payoﬀ. Our ﬁndings indicate that, in situations where3
large weight is placed on the benchmark levels, conditional indexation is fairly close to
being optimal.
Against the backdrop of the international move promoted by the International Ac-
counting Standards Board towards the market-based, fair value accountancy standard,
the valuation of pension liabilities with conditional indexation have become a subject of
increasing interest both to academics and practitioners. In Chapter 3, we consider the val-
uation of conditionally indexed pension liabilities in the framework of market valuation.
We formulate the circularity problem that may arise in the valuation of conditionally
indexed pension liabilities. Namely, the funding ratio determines the indexation level
through a chosen indexation rule (often known as a “policy ladder”), but at the same
time the indexation level may, with market valuation of pension liabilities, have a feed-
back eﬀect on the liability value and in turn on the funding ratio. We develop a backward
recursion approach to the valuation of liabilities subject to the circularity constraint. Nu-
merical examples are used to show the impact of investment strategies and indexation
rules on the liability value. The current implementation of conditional indexation uses as
the basis for indexation decisions a proxy of funding ratio, rather than the funding ratio
based on market-based valuation, and in this way avoids the circularity problem. Our
ﬁndings show that the proxy of funding ratio may be misleading in assessing the actual
ﬁnancial status of pension funds, and for this purpose the actual funding ratio needs to
be computed and used.
Another theme addressed in the thesis is asset allocation. Aside from its relevance
for pension fund management, how to invest and consume in the best way has broader
implications for individuals and institutional investors. In this ﬁeld, there are many
problems yet to be solved, and the other two chapters of the thesis address two of them.
There has been well documented empirical evidence that the equity premia are time-
varying rather than constant. Expected returns on common stocks have been found
to vary over business cycles, and the general message of the empirical evidence is that
expected returns are lower when business conditions are strong and higher when business
conditions are weak. In this situation, optimal consumption and investment strategies
involve timing business conditions. On the other hand, it has long been recognized that
investors do not have complete information about business conditions or the state of
economy. Institutional and individual investors usually disagree on the assessment of the
current business conditions, and economic prospects. This disagreement is symptomatic4 Introduction
of the fact that there is quite some uncertainty surrounding the state of the economy.
In the context of time-varying expected returns, state uncertainty leads to uncertainty
about expected returns, which an investor must take into account in choosing the optimal
consumption and investment.
In Chapter 4, we examine the optimal consumption and asset allocation in a setting
where expected returns on stocks are time-varying, but unobservable. The dynamic opti-
mization problem is addressed in two separate steps, namely estimation and optimization.
The optimal consumption and investment plans can be expressed in closed form in the
stable phase where the investor has a suﬃciently long history of the stock price that she
can no longer improve upon the estimation error. Numerical exercises show that there
is signiﬁcant market timing in the optimal strategy. We also discuss the implications of
this study for the beneﬁt policy of pension funds, and ﬁnd that the beneﬁt should be
relatively stable over time when a constant-proportion investment strategy is employed.
Chapter 5 is devoted to the question how to include the asset class of commodities
into the traditional portfolio of stocks and bonds. Commodities have been emerging as an
increasingly important class of assets for institutional and individual investors in recent
years. Around 2007, the size of the global commodities derivatives market is estimated
to be about 750 billion US dollars. As the markets have grown, more investors have been
attracted to commodities. Increased exposure to commodities has been acquired by both
institutional and individual investors.
Chapter 5 studies commodity investment in the context of dynamic asset allocation,
with a focus on the implications of the commodity return predictability arising from mean
reverting commodity prices. The model of ﬁnancial markets consists of three asset classes:
stocks, bonds, and commodities, which generalizes the benchmark setting of Merton
(1969). The risk premium in the commodity market is assumed to be dependent on the
mean-reverting spot commodity price, and this assumption is supported by the empirical
ﬁndings of the paper. I solve, in closed form, the optimal portfolio and consumption
strategies. The study suggests that allocation to commodities is needed to optimize the
instantaneous risk-return proﬁle (myopic purposes), as well as to hedge the stochastic
changes of the investment opportunity set (intertemporal purposes). The welfare cost of
excluding the commodity from ﬁnancial decision making is also solved in closed form. A
simple numerical exercise shows that there is substantial market timing in the optimal
ﬁnancial policy, and that excluding the asset class of commodities may incur substantial5
welfare costs, especially for long-term and less risk-averse investors.
The thesis is an outcome of research cooperation: Chapters 2 and 3 are joint work
with J.M. Schumacher, whereas Chapter 4 is coauthored with J.C. Rodriguez and J.M.
Schumacher.Chapter 2
Welfare Analysis of Conditional
Indexation Schemes from a
Two-Reference-Point Perspective
2.1 Introduction
Over the years, employers around the world have strived to provide retirement income
security by setting up deﬁned-beneﬁt (DB) pension schemes. Under such schemes, the
employee’s pension beneﬁt is determined by a formula that takes into account such factors
as years of service for the employer and wages or salary, and it is pension sponsors, rather
than pension plan participants, who bear pension investment and longevity risks. For
pension participants, an important appeal of the DB model is that it allows them to
plan their retirement income without requiring much knowledge about saving, portfolio
choice, capital market risks, or mortality trends. DB plans, however, have been faced with
substantial funding pressure in the past two decades because of the aging population and
the move towards the market-based accounting standard. And there has been a strong
trend away from DB plans toward deﬁned-contribution (DC) plans in many countries,
especially in the Anglo-Saxon world. Under a typical DC plan, retirement saving and
income tend to be more subject to employees’ control throughout the life cycle, and hence
it helps to free employers and other sponsors of some, if not all, responsibility for pension
provision under the DB framework.
As stated in the Introduction, it has been increasingly recognized that the shift to
DC plans is far from being a satisfactory solution because they are too complex and
too risky for individuals (see, for instance, Merton [2006]). As is shown by Lusardi and
Mitchell [2006] and van Rooij, Lusardi, and Alessie [2006], individuals often lack the
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ﬁnancial expertise and computation capacities to carry out complex lifetime ﬁnancial
planning. DC plans are also vulnerable to large marketing and management costs, and
to market failure like that stemming from adverse selection in annuity markets. As a
balance between DB and DC, an approach which has been implemented recently by
many Dutch pension funds is to introduce a practice known as “conditional indexation”.
In a conditional indexation scheme, the pension proﬁle of a participant guarantees a
minimum level which is updated each year through a decision on the inﬂation indexation
for that year on the basis of the funding ratio of pension fund (the ratio of asset value to
liability value). That is, the guaranteed level is built up by multiplying a conditionally
granted indexation level each year. If a participant is granted full indexation every year,
then her pension can fully compensate for inﬂation, and it is the maximum pension she
can receive.
Thus conditional indexation schemes are essentially formulated in a framework of two
reference points: they guarantee a minimum nominal amount of pension rights, and at
the same time aim to provide pension rights suﬃcient to fully cover inﬂation. In the
words of Bikker and Vlaar [2007],
“the typical pension contract nowadays comprises an average earnings deﬁned
beneﬁt pension in which only nominal beneﬁts are guaranteed, but with the
intention to provide wage indexation.”
A way of thinking about pension systems is suggested here which has as salient features
the presence of both a minimum beneﬁt (guaranteed amount) and a maximum beneﬁt
(full indexation).
As a middle way between DB and DC, conditional indexation, like traditional DB,
enables participants to enjoy a high level of pension predictability, and like DC, enables
pension funds to have a high level of ﬁnancial stability. While we focus on conditional
indexation from a pension perspective in this chapter, similar schemes are also relevant in
the context of with-proﬁt policies; cf. for instance Grosen and Jørgensen [2002], Ballotta
et al. [2006], and Gatzert and Kling [2007] for a discussion of related schemes.
The introduction of conditional indexation may raise a number of issues, such as the
valuation of pension liabilities, the deﬁnition of accrued pension rights, and long-term
stationarity of pension funds. In this chapter, we focus on the quality of pension proﬁle of
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the assumption that participation in the scheme is compulsory (as is the case in the
Netherlands) so that in practice a ﬁnancial constraint is imposed on participants.
The objective of carrying out an evaluation of alternative investment schemes calls for
the formulation of an evaluation criterion. As is common in the literature, we will use the
expected utility framework of von Neumann and Morgenstern [1944]. This framework
still allows considerable freedom in choosing a utility function. Rather than summarily
eliminating most of this freedom by restricting ourselves to a one-parameter family of
utility functions, we apply some considerations relating to the particular nature of the
investment scheme that is under investigation in this chapter.
Reference points are absent from the power or constant-relative-risk-aversion (CRRA)
utility function, which is the standard criterion underlying much analysis on optimal
pension investment and pension scheme design. It is common though for individuals to
use benchmarks or reference points as an aid in evaluation and decision-making under
uncertainty [Tversky and Kahneman, 1981]. Perhaps the most well-known example to
economists is the notion of loss aversion in prospect theory; one of the deﬁning properties
of loss aversion is that wealth is measured relative to a given reference point. People
divide risky outcomes into gains (greater than the reference point) and losses (less than
the reference point), and experiments have shown that people’s preferences with respect
to gains and with respect to losses are diﬀerent [Kahneman and Tversky, 1979, Tversky
and Kahneman, 1992]. Prospect theory formulates the phenomenon by a utility function
with a kink at the reference point.
People may use diﬀerent reference frameworks for decisions in diﬀerent situations, and
in some cases like the above-mentioned pension fund context it seems more appropriate
to use more than one reference point. March and Shapira [1987] argue that two reference
points may have signiﬁcantly more descriptive power than a single one, and that from
managerial perspectives on risk taking, a target level for performance and a survival level
are the most frequently mentioned references. On the basis of their and other theoretical
studies on multiple reference points, Sullivan and Kida [1995] conduct some experiments
to investigate the eﬀect of multiple reference points on managers’ decision-making under
risk. Their ﬁnding indicates that presence of two reference points is in conformity with a
complex pattern of risk-taking behavior; managers’ decisions are aﬀected by the positions
of risky alternatives relative to two important reference points.
In the ﬁnance literature, the notion of loss aversion, built on the assumption of a single10 Welfare Analysis of Conditional Indexation Schemes
reference point, has been introduced by a number of recent papers, for example, Benartzi
and Thaler [1995], Barberis, Huang, and Santos [2001], Berkelaar, Kouwenberg, and Post
[2004], and Gomes [2005]. The common modeling approach is to introduce a kink in the
reference point distinguishing gains from losses. It may be noted that many commercial
investment products involve guarantees; if such products are to be explained as optimal
from an expected utility perspective, then kinked utility must play a role. Explanatory
factors might include the principal/agent relationship; this factor also plays a role in the
pension context. For the purposes of this chapter we assume that all considerations can
be suﬃciently expressed by a family of kinked utility functions.
Given the salience of two reference points in the pension context, it may be appropriate
to allow the presence of two reference points in formulating preferences. The utility
function we present below is an extended version of the power utility function, allowing
for kinks at two reference points. It is an extension of the power utility function with a
kink at a single reference point that Berkelaar et al. [2004] use to express loss aversion.
In addition to reference points, updating the guaranteed level over time as seen in con-
ditional indexation schemes may be justiﬁed in part by external habit formation. That is,
the reference point that people use to evaluate their consumption depends on the history
of general consumption level, reﬂecting people’s desire to “catch up with the Joneses”.
In this chapter, however, we abstract from this point in formulating a benchmark utility
function, in view of the absence of a ﬁrmly established standard for expressing external
habit formation, and also to stay close to the classical CRRA framework.
The implication of two reference points for pension ﬁnance can be shown through
looking at the investment policy optimal with respect to the extended power utility
function incorporating reference points. Assuming the standard Black and Scholes [1973]
economy, we shall solve for the optimal investment policy in the sense that the expected
utility of participants is maximized. As will be presented below, the optimal investment
strategy can be characterized by a (partial) ﬂoor protection at the lower reference point,
as well as a (partial) cap at the upper reference point. Intuitively, it can be interpreted
as buying partial ﬂoor protection through selling part of the upside potential, similarly
as in a collar construction. Compared with loss-averse preference which is characterized
by utility function with a kink at a single reference point, the strategy optimal for the
preference with two reference points provides a better downside protection at the cost of
forgoing more upside potential.2.1 Introduction 11
The subject of welfare analysis is a stylized conditional indexation scheme which is
constructed to have a dynamically updated guaranteed level as seen in practice. To make
the welfare analysis comparable to standard life-cycle investment studies, we impose that
conditional indexation schemes be ﬁnancially fair in the sense that the value of pension
rights is equal to the value of contributions. In the absence of ﬁnancial fairness, some
participants could be arbitrarily better oﬀ with ex ante wealth transfer from others.
To this end, we shall discuss ways in which one may construct pension systems that
combine conditional indexation with ﬁnancial fairness. The main idea we use below is
contingent exchange of one option by another of equal value, with continuous updating
of the parameters characterizing the options. This implies that conditional indexation as
deﬁned here could in principle be used by an individual as a private investment scheme.
Being implemented in a ﬁnancially fair manner, conditional indexation schemes can then
be subject to welfare analysis to see how good conditional indexation schemes can be from
the life-cycle investment perspective of participants. We illustrate by numerical examples
how the evaluation outcome depends on the presence and strength of the reference points.
Since our purpose in this chapter is to focus on the welfare implications of conditional
indexation, we avoid technical complications due to factors that we believe are less directly
related to the conditional indexation idea. We do introduce, as discussed above, utility
functions that involve particular reference points because such reference points also play a
role in conditional indexation. However we do not include in the analysis several features
that are often considered in the recent lifecycle investment literature, such as human
capital, stochastic interest rates, stochastic inﬂation, longevity risk, and asset return
predictability. In a more comprehensive investigation, such factors should be taken into
account; here our aim is to present a ﬁrst analysis.
The chapter is organized as follows. In the next section, we formulate a class of
piecewise power utility functions to allow that risky outcomes are evaluated against two
reference points, and specify the ﬁnancial setting. To establish the benchmark of the
welfare analysis, the pension investment optimal for this class of utility functions is
investigated in Section 2.3. Section 2.4 discusses the formulation of conditional indexation
schemes whose payoﬀ structure is close to those generated by collective pension funds
in practice. The welfare analysis of conditional indexation schemes is illustrated by
numerical examples in Section 2.5. Some concluding remarks are in Section 5.6.12 Welfare Analysis of Conditional Indexation Schemes
2.2 The model
2.2.1 The utility function
The power utility function is the most widely used evaluation measure in the literature
on dynamic asset allocation. It has some desirable properties in terms of mathematical
tractability, and it reﬂects constant relative risk aversion, which is thought to be a rea-
sonable assumption on people’s risk preferences. The power utility function is also used
as a building block to accommodate other attributes of preferences like loss aversion and
habit formation. In this respect, refer to Berkelaar et al. [2004] for an example on loss
aversion, and to Sundaresan [1989] and Campbell and Cochrane [1999] on habit forma-
tion. Following a similar approach, we propose a utility function with the power utility
as a building block in order to reﬂect the presence of reference points.
Assume that an individual considers pension investment in a framework of two refer-
ence points: a guaranteed level and an intention level, denoted by θ1 and θ2 respectively.
With respect to the two reference points, possible pension payoﬀs at retirement, W, can
be divided into three regions: below the guaranteed level, beyond the intention level, and
in between. As in papers on loss aversion, the presence of the two reference points is
formulated by two kinks corresponding to the two points in the utility function. Within
each of the three regions, the utility is speciﬁed in the standard power form, reﬂecting
locally constant relative risk aversion. In addition, we impose that the utility function
should be continuous.
In general, the utility function can be formulated by a piecewise power function char-
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(2.1b)
In the above, the parameters γL, γM, and γR are positive and represent the local con-
stant relative risk aversion within the left, middle, and right regions, respectively. The
parameters κL and κU, which must be greater than or equal to 1 to ensure concavity,
denote the “kinkedness” of the utility function at the lower and upper reference points.2.2 The model 13
For simplicity, we mainly work with the two-parameter family that is obtained by the
simpliﬁcation that the degrees of kinkedness are identical at both reference points and





κψ(W,γ) + (1 − κ)ψ(θ1,γ) for W ≤ θ1,
ψ(W,γ) for θ1 < W < θ2,
1
κψ(W,γ) + (1 − 1
κ)ψ(θ2,γ) for W ≥ θ2,
(2.2)
where γ (> 0) is the local rate of relative risk aversion, and κ (≥ 1) is the kinkedness
parameter (Figure 2.1).
There is a parameter similar to κ in the utility function of prospect theory that
represents the degree of loss aversion. Tversky and Kahneman [1992] estimate that the
loss aversion parameter is equal to 2.25 based on the experimental results of a group
of individuals facing hypothetical decision problems. The two kinks cause the marginal
utility to jump at the two reference points. We note that when κ = 1, the utility function
is reduced to the standard power utility function, and that it also incorporates the utility
function considered by Berkelaar et al. [2004] as a special case when θ2 is inﬁnity. Because
of the kinks, the preference expressed by the piecewise utility function has the property
of ﬁrst-order risk aversion at the reference points [Segal and Spivak, 1990].
2.2.2 The ﬁnancial setting
We assume that the individual, over the working life, contributes to an occupational
pension scheme an amount whose value is known at entry into the pension system, and
receives a lump-sum pension at retirement. In line with standard life-cycle investment
analysis, the individual, within the expected utility framework, would invest the con-
tributed amount in such a way that the expected utility over the lump-sum pension is
maximized. We work in a highly simpliﬁed setting, namely the standard Black-Scholes
economy. This assumption, in addition to simplifying the analysis, allows one to focus on
the impact on pension investment of two reference points, and makes it straightforward to
examine some popular investment policies that already developed in a complete-market
setting from a new perspective. Speciﬁcally, the ﬁnancial setting is as follows.
• The only risk factor is stock market risk, and it is traded through a stock index St
following geometric Brownian motion
dSt =  Stdt + σStdZt,14 Welfare Analysis of Conditional Indexation Schemes




















Figure 2.1: The two-parameter class of utility functions (2.2) This ﬁgure visualizes
the utility function for diﬀerent values of the kinkedness parameter: κ = 1 (dash-dotted), κ = 2.25
(dotted), κ = 5 (dashed), κ = 10 (solid). Other parameter values are: γ = 1, θ1 = 223, and θ2 = 495.
where   and σ are the constant drift and volatility parameters, and Zt is a standard
Brownian motion.
• The riskless asset is a cash bond with constant interest rate r, whose price Bt
changes according to
dBt = rBtdt.
• Thus the pricing kernel (stochastic discount factor) ξt is characterized by
dξt = −rξtdt − λξtdZt,
where λ =
 −r
σ is the market price of risk.
• We assume that the individual makes a single contribution at time t = 0, and retires
and receives pension at t = T. The value at time 0 of the contribution is denoted
by W0.
• We assume that two levels θ1 and θ2 have been deﬁned which satisfy θ1 < erTW0 <
θ2 and which are referred to as the guaranteed level and the intention level, re-
spectively. The corresponding annualized growth rates π1 := 1
T log(θ1/W0) and2.3 Pension investment for the benchmark utility 15
π2 := 1
T log(θ2/W0) will for concreteness be referred to as price inﬂation and wage
inﬂation respectively. The theory allows other interpretations as well, as long as
the inequalities π1 < r < π2 are satisﬁed; for instance π1 might correspond to a
nominal guarantee.
• We shall illustrate results by numerical examples. For this purpose, it is assumed
that the economy is characterized by an annual risk-free interest rate of 3%, stock
risk premium of 4 percent per year (i. e.   = 7%), stock market volatility of 20
percent per year, an annual price inﬂation of 2 percent and an annual wage inﬂation
of 4 percent. The working life of the individual is 40 years. The present value of
the contribution at time t = 0 is 100. Thus the guaranteed and intention levels are
223 and 495, respectively. The parameter values are summarized in Table 2.1.
r   σ π1 π2 W0 T θ1 θ2
3% 7% 20% 2% 4% 100 40 223 495
Table 2.1: The parameter values
2.3 Pension investment for the benchmark utility
To understand the benchmark utility function in the context of life-cycle investment, we
now investigate the investment policy sought by the individual to optimize E[U(WT)].
In a complete market, such as the Black-Scholes economy, the optimal pension payoﬀ as
a function of the state of the economy can be obtained using the equivalent martingale




where (U′)−1 denotes the inverse of the marginal utility function, and y is a Lagrange
multiplier which is determined by the budget constraint E[ξTWT] = W0. In the context of
a collective pension fund, the budget constraint can be interpreted as imposing ﬁnancial
fairness between generations.
For the piecewise power utility function (2.2), one can solve the optimal proﬁle of
pension WT as a function of the value of pricing kernel at retirement ξT (see Appendix
2.A). To make the optimal pension proﬁle intuitively more appealing, Figure 2.2 plots
the optimal pension as a function of the annualized return of stock markets. The optimal16 Welfare Analysis of Conditional Indexation Schemes






















































Figure 2.2: The optimal pension as a function of stock market return This ﬁgure
shows the optimal pension payoﬀ for the utility function (2.2) as a function of the stock index return
assuming the parameter values: κ = 10, γ = 1, θ1 = 223, and θ2 = 495 (bold line). For comparison,
the ﬁgure also shows the optimal proﬁles for a CRRA utility (κ = 1, γ = 3; drawn line), the standard
logarithmic utility (κ = 1, γ = 1; dotted line), and a utility function with only one kink (θ2 = ∞;
dash-dotted line). For parameter values not mentioned here, see Table 2.1.
pension proﬁle falls into ﬁve regions: three slopes connected by two plateaus. In the slope
regions, the pension right is increasing with the return on the stock index. In the plateau
regions, the pension beneﬁt is constant at the reference levels, independent of stock index
changes. The optimal proﬁle of pension beneﬁts can be characterized as a partial ﬂoor
protection, attained at the cost of forgoing some upside potential of stock markets.
The implication of the two reference points can also manifest itself through comparison
to the optimal payoﬀs for alternative utility functions. Figure 2.2 also shows the payoﬀs
optimal for the standard power preference and the loss-aversion preference. Berkelaar
et al. [2004] show that loss aversion as expressed by a single reference point leads to a
partial portfolio insurance strategy. In comparison with the loss-averse agent and the
CRRA agent, the participant who uses two reference points gives up more payoﬀ in good
states of the ﬁnancial market to ﬁnance a better downside protection.
To illustrate the impact on the optimal pension beneﬁt of the two parameters used
in (2.2), κ and γ, Figure 2.3 presents the cumulative distribution of the optimal proﬁle
of pension beneﬁts for various values of the parameters. The six plots on the ﬁrst row,
assuming γ = 1, show the simulated cumulative distribution functions of the optimal pen-2.3 Pension investment for the benchmark utility 17
sion beneﬁts for varying values of κ. For κ greater than 1, the optimal proﬁles of pension
beneﬁts invariably feature probability clustering at the two reference levels, reﬂecting a
partial portfolio insurance and selling of upside potentials. The clustering becomes more
pronounced with increasing prominence of the reference points. For the level of kinked-
ness equal to the rate of loss aversion reported by Tversky and Kahneman [1992], the
probabilities of having pension beneﬁts at the guaranteed and intention levels are about
9 percent and 25 percent respectively. For κ = 10, the clustering becomes dominant,
with the probabilities increased to about 10 per cent and 60 percent respectively. If the
eﬀect of the reference points is so strong as to justify κ = 100, then the optimal pension
beneﬁt is close to a binary payoﬀ structure: the guaranteed level will be paid if the stock
market index is below a certain level at retirement, otherwise the intention level will be
paid. Actually, it can be shown that a binary payoﬀ structure is optimal in the extreme
case where γ = 0 and κ = ∞ (See Appendix 2.A).
The plots on the second row of Figure 2.3, assuming κ = 1, present the distributions
of the optimal pension beneﬁts for varying degrees of risk aversion. In this case, the
preference reduces to the standard CRRA. As discovered by Samuelson [1969] and Merton
[1969], the CRRA individual ﬁnds it optimal for allocate a constant proportion of pension
asset value in risky assets. This type of strategies, known as “constant-proportion” or
“ﬁxed-mix” strategies, lead to a lognormally distributed proﬁle of pension beneﬁt in an
economy of the Black-Scholes type. In a given ﬁnancial market, the proportion in risky
assets is determined by the rate of relative risk aversion: in the Black-Scholes economy,
the proportion of pension assets in risky assets is λ/σγ, where λ is the market price of
risk as introduced before. As shown in Figure 2.3, the variability of the lognormally
distributed pension beneﬁts generated by this strategy is decreasing with the degree of
risk aversion. For CRRA preference, an increasing degree of risk aversion will make
pension beneﬁts concentrate more and more on a single value, rather than on the two
reference levels as in the case of kinked utility. The diﬀerence highlights that κ and γ in
the utility function (2.2) reﬂect diﬀerent aspects of preference.
To complete the discussion on the investment policy for the benchmark class of utility
functions, we turn to the investment strategy needed to realize the optimal proﬁle of
pension rights at retirement. The optimal pension can be viewed as a contingent payoﬀ
that can be replicated by a delta replication strategy. The fundamental theorem of asset
pricing tells us that the process {ξtWt} is a martingale, so the optimal pension asset value18 Welfare Analysis of Conditional Indexation Schemes
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Figure 2.3: Cumulative distribution of the optimal pension for diﬀerent values
of κ and γ The ﬁgure illustrates the impact of κ and γ on the optimal investment through simulated
cumulative distribution function of the resulting pension value at time T. The plots on the ﬁrst row are
for ﬁxed γ and varying values of κ, where those on the second row are for κ = 1 and varying values of
γ. For parameter values not mentioned here, see Table 2.1.





Following this approach, one can solve the optimal pension asset value Wt as a function
of time t and the value of the pricing kernel (Wt = f(t,ξt)).
Given the one-to-one correspondence between the pricing kernel and the stock price
in the Black-Scholes economy, the optimal pension asset value can also be expressed as
a function of time and of the stock index value St, i. e. Wt = g(t,St). The holdings of
risky assets (“delta”) can be determined by the partial derivative of the optimal pension
asset value at time t with respect to the stock market level at time t. As an alternative
to computing the delta, we characterize the optimal investment strategy by the weight of
pension asset value invested in the stock index (see Appendix 2.A). Figure 2.4 illustrates
the optimal investment policy by presenting the stock weight as a function of time and











































Figure 2.4: The optimal stock weight The ﬁgure shows the optimal stock weight as a
function of time and return on stock markets. The “time” axis represents the calender time, whereas
the “return on stock market” axis the return on the stock index so far. It is assumed that κ = 10 and
γ = 1. For parameter values not mentioned here, see Table 2.1.
viewing). The investment strategy requires a sophisticated, dynamic adjustment of the
stock weight depending on time and on the realized return on stock markets. The relation
between the weight and the return on stock markets is of a “W” shape. The intuition is as
follows. When the return on stock markets is at such levels that it is likely to realize the
guaranteed or intention levels, then a low weight in risky assets is needed to ascertain the
realization of the reference levels. However, if it is very unlikely for the terminal pension
asset value to be at the two reference levels due to, for instance, very strong or weak stock
markets, then the pension fund will behave like a constant-relative-risk-averse investor
with no kinks, and the weight in risky assets is approaching that required by a constant
proportion strategy.1 This eﬀect is in particular strong at times close to maturity. In
scenarios where stock returns are good for some time but then go down, the optimal
strategy reduces the stock holdings when bad returns appear, so as to reach at least the
upper threshold with high probability.
1If there are no kinks (κ = 1), the resulting CRRA utility with unit rate of relative risk aversion
will, for the parameter values considered in the chapter, lead to a constant proportion strategy which
allocates 100 percent of the pension asset value in stock markets independent of time and of the stock
market performance.20 Welfare Analysis of Conditional Indexation Schemes
2.4 Conditional indexation schemes
As mentioned above, a deﬁning property of conditional indexation schemes is that the
guaranteed amount of pension is adjusted over time. For instance, if a participant is
granted full indexation to wage inﬂation each year after her entry into the fund, then
the two thresholds will converge with the guaranteed amount approaching the intention
amount at retirement. On the other hand, if the participant is so unlucky as to receive no
indexation at all during the entire working life, then the guaranteed amount at retirement
will be same as the amount that was already guaranteed at the time of entry.
Given the diversity of conditional indexation schemes, it is far from being trivial to
ask which one to take as the subject of welfare analysis. Our purpose in this chapter is to
construct pension schemes with the deﬁning property of dynamically adjusted guaranteed
level as stylized conditional indexation schemes. The current practice of conditional
indexation is implemented collectively by pension funds, and some studies show that
the resulting conditional indexation schemes are not necessarily ﬁnancially fair on a
generation-by-generation basis in the sense that the value of the pension payoﬀ may not
be equal to the value of the contribution. It has been estimated that redistribution of
wealth may reach 30% or more of the value of the liabilities [Kocken, 2007, p.37] (cf.
also Kocken [2006] for a more extensive theoretical analysis). For the purpose of welfare
analysis, it is necessary to impose the condition of ﬁnancial fairness, since the absence of
ﬁnancial fairness implies that one individual can be arbitrarily better oﬀ through wealth
transfer from others. Therefore in the construction of stylized schemes, we impose the
condition of ﬁnancial fairness.
The construction of the stylized conditional indexation schemes starts with a digital
contingent claim at time 0. Such a claim is optimal under a kinked utility function with
γ = 0 and κ = ∞ (a piecewise linear function which drops to −∞ at the guaranteed
level and which saturates at the intention level). The claim is written on the stock index,
and at retirement pays the guaranteed level θ1, if the index is below a certain strike;
otherwise it pays the intention level θ2. At time 0, the value of the option is equal to the
contribution value, W0. In the Black-Scholes economy, the given θ1, θ2, and the option
value W0 determine the strike of the option as in (2.16). Browne [1999] shows that the
policy to maximize the probability of reaching a given value wealth by a deadline is to buy
a European digital option with a particular strike price and payoﬀ. Applying Browne’s2.4 Conditional indexation schemes 21
insight, one can show that the digital claim maximizes the probability of reaching the
intention level while subject to the constraint of not falling short of the guaranteed level.












where Φ−1( ) denotes the inverse of the standard normal cumulative distribution function.
The above equation for p is well deﬁned only for e−rTθ1 ≤ W0 ≤ e−rTθ2, where the scheme
is reduced to the all-bond scheme for W0 = e−rTθ2. In the following welfare analysis, the
case where W0 > e−rTθ2 may arise. In such a case, we use the all-bond scheme with payoﬀ
WT = e−rTW0 to replace both the digital scheme and the stylized conditional indexation
scheme constructed on the basis of the digital scheme.
The digital option by itself reﬂects the idea of a guaranteed level, but not the idea
of conditional indexation. We would like to increase the guaranteed level when circum-
stances allow. Assume that circumstances are indeed found favorable at a ﬁrst review
date following time 0; then it is possible to sell the digital option that was purchased
at time 0 and to buy a new digital option that has an increased lower level. The self-
ﬁnancing property of the strategy is guaranteed by requiring that the value of the newly
bought option at the time of its purchase is equal to the value of the previously owned
option at that time.
In this way we obtain one constraint on the characteristics of the new option to be
bought. However, a digital option is characterized by three parameters (upper level,
lower level, and strike) so that two degrees of freedom remain. As a second constraint,
we impose that the intention level θ2 remains the same. The third constraint might be
provided by imposing that the strike also remains the same, but a more basic requirement
may be that the probability of reaching the upper level is kept constant. This may be
motivated if one thinks of the size of the investment at time 0 as reﬂecting an implicit
decision on the probability of reaching the intention level, via the relation (2.5).
Under the proposed rules, high returns on the stock market will result in an increase
of the guaranteed level, while both the intention level and the probability of reaching
that level remain constant. Under the assumptions of the Black-Scholes market, we can
and will consider a continuous-time version of the proposed strategy; moreover, using
the completeness of the Black-Scholes market, the process of buying and selling options
can be replicated by suitable portfolio rebalancings. We will consider two versions of22 Welfare Analysis of Conditional Indexation Schemes
the proposed scheme; one in which the rules as stated above are applied irrespective of
stock returns, so that also downward adjustments may take place, and another (which
is closer to practice) in which adjustments in the downward direction are not made and
one accepts that under adverse circumstances the probability of reaching the intention
level decreases.
2.4.1 The updating rules
Version I: two-way adjustment This rule prescribes that the probability of reaching
the intention level be constant over time. In particular, if the probability of reaching the
intention level increases (decreases) due to an upturn (downturn) of the stock index, then
the strike denoted by K
(1)
t is adjusted upwards (downwards) to the level that restores
the probability to the benchmark p. At the same time, the guaranteed level, denoted by
θ
(1)
1,t, is increased (decreased) to ensure that the update is self-ﬁnancing. This scheme is
mainly of academic interest; a more realistic scheme that allows only one-way adjustment
is described below. Appendix 2.A shows that the two-way adjustment rule leads to
dynamics of the strike K
(1)
t and guaranteed level θ
(1)


















































As an alternative to the stochastic diﬀerential equation (2.6), the dynamics of the strike
can be explicitly expressed as a function of the stock index value:
K
(1)
t = St exp
 
(  − 1
2σ






As can be seen from (2.8), the strike tends to the stock index as t approaches T, which
implies that the investment policy is to take an increasingly sensitive bet in the form of
digital options that are increasingly at the money. For the dynamics of the guaranteed
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that is, the guaranteed levels converge in probability to the intention level as t approaches
T (see Appendix 2.A). This is not surprising given that the drift and volatility terms of
(2.7) “explode” as t approaches T unless the guaranteed level converges to the intention
level.
Version II: ratchet adjustment This rule introduces a “ratchet” eﬀect by allowing
only upward adjustment of the guaranteed level. In a nutshell, the updating rule is to
keep the probability of reaching the intention level no higher than the benchmark p. The
updating is the same as version I in case of stock market upturns: if the stock markets
rise, and the probability of reaching the intention level rises above the benchmark, then
the strike and the guaranteed level are adjusted upwards in such a way as to restore the
probability to the benchmark. In case of stock market downturns where the probability
falls short of the benchmark, however, the strike and the guaranteed level are unchanged.
As such, the strike, K
(2)
t , and the guaranteed level, θ
(2)
1,t, can be adjusted upward only.
The strike resulting from this version of conditional indexation, denoted by K
(2)
t , is the








Given the dynamics of the strike, one can determine the updating of the guaranteed level
by the requirement that the value of the updated pension rights should be unchanged.
The SDE for the guaranteed level is not of a simple form, so it is omitted here. We only
note that the running-maximum relationship does not hold for the guaranteed levels.
Figure 2.5 presents a simulated history of the strikes and guaranteed levels for the two
updating rules. It illustrates the increasing volatility of the guaranteed level on the basis
of the ﬁrst version as t approaches T, and the running-maximum relationship between
the strike prices resulting from the two rules.
2.4.2 The pension rights of the conditional indexation schemes
We now want to see the eﬀect of both strategies on WT, the realized capital at time T.
First, deﬁne by continuity the values of the strikes and the guaranteed levels at time T
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Figure 2.5: Simulated histories of the strike and the guaranteed level The upper
panel is a simulated scenario of the stock index over 40 years, and the corresponding histories of the
strike and the guaranteed level are in the middle and lower panels, respectively. In the middle and lower
panels, the histories based on the two-way updating rule are represented by solid line, and those based
on the ratchet updating by dashed line. For the parameter values of the simulation, see Table 2.1.
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1,T, i = 1,2. (2.11)
For the conditional indexation of version I, given that the guaranteed level converges
to the intention level in probability, the pension rights at retirement also converge to the
intention level. This is a peculiar outcome since it appears to construct an arbitrage op-
portunity; the proposed investment strategy seems to ensure a return that is higher than
the riskless return. The explanation is that this version of conditional indexation allows
“outrageous” investment behavior which violates the admissibility assumption in the ﬁ-
nance literature (see, e. g. Section 6.C of Duﬃe [2001]). Like the well-known “doubling”
strategy, the ﬁrst version of conditional indexation involves shorting more and more of
the riskless asset and going long in the risky asset in some states of nature, and it has
to allow the possibility that pension asset value can go negative and be unbounded from
below before the intention level is actually attained. Investment strategies of this nature
are usually ruled out in the ﬁnance literature by the admissibility assumption which ei-
ther prohibits the wealth process from going negative or imposes a square-integrability
condition.2.5 Welfare analysis 25
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Scatter plot of pension benefits w.r.t. return of stock markets
Figure 2.6: The pension beneﬁts resulting from the ratchet conditional index-
ation The ﬁgure shows the pension proﬁle from the ratchet rule of conditional indexation. The upper
panel presents a simulated histogram of the pension rights whereas the lower panel illustrates the relation
between the return on the stock index and the amount of pension rights. The number of simulations is
10,000. See Section 2.2.2 for the parameter values of the simulations.
For the ratchet indexation, Figure 2.6 presents the distribution of the pension rights
in our standard example. Also shown is the relation between the pension rights and the
annualized return on stock markets. In addition to the notable concentration on the two
original thresholds, the pension rights generated by ratchet conditional indexation have
considerable probability of falling in the intermediate region between the two thresholds.
The pension rights are path-dependent, rather than dependent solely on the stock index
level at retirement. The resultant pension scheme will be used as the stylized conditional
indexation scheme in the following welfare analysis.
2.5 Welfare analysis
By now we have set up the criterion and the subject of the welfare analysis. To apply
welfare analysis to the stylized conditional indexation scheme against the utility function
(2.2), we have to resort to numerical methods because of the absence of an analytical solu-
tion. Therefore we need to choose the value of parameters characterizing the benchmark
utility, in particular, κ and γ. Tversky and Kahneman [1992], based on psychological26 Welfare Analysis of Conditional Indexation Schemes
Benchmark: γ = 1, κ =     1 2.25 5 10 100
optimal for γ = 2, κ = 1 22.2 3.7 8.7 21.9 86.1
best constant-proportion 0.0 3.4 4.2 5.6 9.2
corresponding RRA 1.0 1.5 3.0 3.5 5.5
optimal for γ = 0, κ = ∞ 122.7 50.6 5.0 1.4 0.6
conditional indexation 122.7 29.8 9.9 6.4 6.0
Table 2.2: The welfare loss of various schemes against the benchmark utility
with diﬀerent parameter values (in percent) The table reports the welfare loss in terms
of the additional percentage of contribution value which is required to for a pension scheme to reach the
same level of expected utility as is obtained from the optimal strategy. The numbers in smaller font are
the rates of relative risk aversion corresponding to the best constant-proportion schemes. Notice that
the ﬁrst column (κ = 1) actually uses the standard logarithmic utility as the benchmark.
experiments, estimate that the rates of local relative risk aversion are rather small (+0.12
in the gain region, and −0.12 in the loss region).2 Most literature on application of the
idea of loss aversion to ﬁnance (e. g. Ait-Sahalia and Brandt [2001], Barberis et al. [2001],
Berkelaar et al. [2004], and Gomes [2005]) assumes that the coeﬃcient of local relative
risk aversion is between 0 and 1. We shall take γ = 1 in the following. As for κ, the
estimated value of 2.25 that Tversky and Kahneman [1992] obtain in the context of loss
aversion is on the basis of the choices of a group of individuals facing hypothetical de-
cision problems. Given the critical importance of retirement income security, a higher
degree of kinkedness may be reasonable. In addition, the standard CRRA utility will be
included as a special case of (2.2). Thus we consider κ ∈ {1,2.25,5,10,100}.
The purpose of the welfare analysis is to assess the quality of conditional indexation
schemes to individuals whose preference is characterized by the family of utility functions
(2.2) in the context of lifecycle investment. The performance is measured by welfare loss
in terms of the additional contribution value required for a pension scheme to reach
the same level of expected utility as is obtained from the optimal strategy. Apart from
the stylized conditional indexation scheme, other pension schemes are considered for
comparison purposes (see Appendix 2.A for the computation of expected utility of these
schemes).
2A utility function typical prospect theory is of the following convex-concave shape
U(W) =
 
−A(θ − W)b1 for W ≤ θ,
+B(W − θ)b2 for W > θ.
It becomes approximately piecewise linear (i.e., approximately locally risk neutral) based on the esti-
mated values of b1 = 0.88 and b2 = −0.88. As indicated by Sharpe [1998], the (approximate) local
risk-neutrality leads to investment strategies that are rather extreme.2.5 Welfare analysis 27
First consider the pension schemes resulting from constant-proportion strategies char-
acterized by diﬀerent stock weights. The second row of Table 2.2 shows results for a
scheme with a constant stock weight of 50%, which, in the numerical setting as given in
Table 2.1, is optimal for the CRRA preference when the coeﬃcient of relative risk aver-
sion is equal to 2. If the benchmark utility is the standard logarithmic utility (κ = 1),
the welfare loss of this constant-proportion scheme is substantial because of insuﬃcient
risk taking: over 20% more contribution is needed for the scheme to obtain the same
level of expected utility as the optimal strategy, which is a constant-proportion scheme
with 100% stock weight. If the two reference points are present in the individual pref-
erence, and their signiﬁcance is moderate with κ = 2.25, then this scheme looks much
better with welfare loss less than 4%. The two kinks introduce ﬁrst-order risk aversion,
and hence make the 50%-stock-weight scheme look more favorable against the kinked
benchmark utility than against the logarithmic benchmark. From this perspective, the
parameters κ and γ, albeit reﬂecting diﬀerent aspects of preference, substitute for each
other to some extent. As the kinkedness parameter increases, however, the welfare loss
increases considerably. A plausible explanation of large welfare loss for large κ value is
that an individual with strongly kinked utility favors good downside protection at the
cost of giving up upside potential, in which respect the constant-proportion scheme is
poor.
In the sphere of constant-proportion strategies, one can vary the stock weight in or-
der to maximize the expected utility with respect to the (possibly kinked) benchmark
utility. We refer to the optimal constant-proportion schemes with respect to the bench-
mark utility as the best constant-proportion scheme. When the benchmark is reduced to
the logarithmic utility, the best constant-proportion scheme has no welfare loss simply
because the scheme keeps stock weight equal to level required by the logarithmic utility.
As can be seen from the third row of Table 2.2, for kinked benchmark utility, the welfare
loss of the best constant-proportion schemes is increasing with the kinkedness parameter.
Welfare losses reﬂect the inability of constant-proportion schemes to provide downside
protection required by the kinked benchmark utility. Moreover, for a more kinked bench-
mark, the best constant-proportion scheme decreases risk-taking, as is seen from the fact
that the rate of relative risk aversion corresponding to the stock weight of the scheme
(shown in smaller font in the table) is increasing with κ.
Another scheme we consider for comparison is the rigid digital scheme which at re-28 Welfare Analysis of Conditional Indexation Schemes
tirement pays the guaranteed level if the stock index is below the strike given by (2.16),
and pays the intention level otherwise. As mentioned above, the digital scheme forms the
basis of the construction of the stylized conditional indexation scheme, and is optimal
with respect to the kinked utility function (2.2) with κ = ∞ and γ = 0. The digital
scheme suﬀers from welfare loss in that (i) it assumes the greatest possible strength of
the reference points (κ = ∞), and (ii) it assumes local risk neutrality (γ = 0). As shown
in the fourth row of Table 2.2, the digital scheme’s welfare loss decreases with the value of
the kinkedness parameter κ used in the benchmark utility. When κ ≥ 10, the welfare loss
becomes rather small. It is a natural outcome, recalling that the pension proﬁle which is
optimal for a kinked benchmark utility with large values of κ resembles the payoﬀ of a
digital option as illustrated in Figure 2.3.
The stylized conditional indexation scheme, the focus of the welfare analysis, is built
on the basis of the digital scheme through updating the lower threshold over time. As the
bottom row of Table 2.2 shows, like the digital scheme, the conditional indexation scheme
incurs a welfare loss which is decreasing with the kinkedness of the benchmark utility.
For an individual with logarithmic or a mildly kinked utility (κ = 1, or 2.25), the utility
loss of the conditional indexation scheme (and the digital scheme) is signiﬁcant. Against
the logarithmic benchmark, for the conditional indexation scheme and the digital scheme
to achieve the same utility level as is obtained by the optimal scheme, it is insuﬃcient
that the contribution is increased to such a level that the probability of reaching the
intention level is one, i. e. to the level equal to θ2e−rT. As mentioned earlier, the two
schemes are assumed to be reduced to the all-bond scheme with payoﬀ equal to e−rTW0,
and the welfare loss is computed accordingly.
In comparison with the digital scheme, the dynamic updating of the guaranteed
level introduces another element of suboptimality with respect to the benchmark utility,
namely a non-constant lower reference point. It perhaps accounts for the welfare loss of
the conditional indexation scheme being higher than that of the digital scheme in the
case where κ ≥ 5. Nevertheless, against the strongly kinked benchmark utility (e. g.
κ = 10 or 100), the stylized conditional indexation scheme is close to the optimal as it
has a moderate welfare loss of about 6%. In short, for individuals in whose preference
the reference points play little role, the stylized conditional indexation scheme leads to
material welfare loss, while for those paying much attention to the references, the scheme
oﬀers a reasonable option for retirement savings from the point of view of welfare analysis.2.6 Concluding remarks 29
2.6 Concluding remarks
In this chapter we have used welfare analysis to evaluate the performance of conditional
indexation schemes from a life-cycle investment perspective. This type of analysis is
usually applied to study the eﬀect of constraints. Conditional indexation in principle
is not a constraint, but eﬀectively such schemes imposed by compulsory participation
cannot be undone by participants without costs, and they are taken as given by most
people. For this reason, the welfare analysis on the basis of frictionless ﬁnancial market,
where participant actually need not care about the sub-optimality of pension schemes
in that they are capable of undoing any ﬁnancial contracts and achieving their optimal
investment proﬁle themselves free of cost, is still relevant in providing insights into the
performance of conditional indexation schemes in practice.
For the purpose of this analysis, we needed to establish both the criterion and the
subject of the utility analysis, namely a benchmark utility and representative conditional
indexation schemes. To do justice to the two reference points which underlie the formu-
lation of conditional indexation, and which often stand out in the discussion of pension
provision, we propose as the benchmark utility an extended family of CRRA utility func-
tions which accommodate the presence of reference points. The two reference points, as
reﬂected by kinks in the utility function, lead to a pension investment policy with par-
tial ﬂoor protection attained at the cost of forgoing some upside potential. The stylized
conditional indexation scheme subject to welfare analysis is constructed to have a ratchet-
adjusted guaranteed level, reﬂecting common practice. Possibly deviating from practice,
the stylized scheme is ﬁnancially fair because it is constructed on a self-ﬁnancing basis.
The property of ﬁnancial fairness ensures that it makes sense to investigate conditional
indexation schemes by means of utility analysis, and that such schemes are comparable
to life-cycle investment policies.
Some numerical exercises show the inﬂuence of reference in the benchmark utility on
the evaluation outcome of the stylized conditional indexation scheme. If the eﬀect of
the reference points is weak or even absent, the conditional indexation incurs substantial
utility loss. If, however, the reference points are signiﬁcant in preference, the scheme oﬀers
a reasonably good approach to pension provision as the welfare loss vis-` a-vis the optimal
is moderate. Conversely, increasing attention to conditional indexation may therefore be
viewed as evidence of the presence and signiﬁcance of reference points in participants’30 Welfare Analysis of Conditional Indexation Schemes
evaluation of pension provision.
The stylized conditional indexation scheme has been formulated in such a way that
it can be implemented by an individual. However, the implementation of conditional
indexation is usually done by collective funds. The collective implementation may play a
role in saving transaction costs, and hence have an impact on the evaluation of pension
schemes. It is a point beyond the scope of this chapter, and subject to further research.
Another avenue for further research will be to use more realistic ﬁnancial settings, for
example, stochastic inﬂation rates, stochastic interest rates, and the possible long-term
predictability of asset returns.
2.A Appendix
Derivation of the optimal pension proﬁle WT and investment
strategy under piecewise power utility
The optimal pension proﬁle WT






κW −γ for W ≤ θ1,
W −γ for θ1 ≤ W ≤ θ2,
1
κW −γ for W ≥ θ2.
Then the optimal pension proﬁle at time T can be obtained by the Cox and Huang [1989]
approach as expressed in (2.3);4 in particular,
WT =

     
     
(κyξT)
− 1
γ for ξT ≤ ξ1,
θ2 for ξ1 < ξT ≤ ξ2,
(yξT)
− 1
γ for ξ2 < ξT < ξ3,





γ for ξT ≥ ξ4,
(2.12)
where ξ1 = 1
κyθ
−γ
2 , ξ2 = 1
yθ
−γ
2 , ξ3 = 1
yθ
−γ




3In the case of utility functions that are not everywhere diﬀerentiable, marginal utility can be ex-
pressed by the superdiﬀerential, which is a multivalued function. For simplicity, we do not adapt the
notation.
4Because the above marginal utility “function” involves a one-to-many mapping at θ1 and θ2, it is
not a function in the normal sense of being one-to-one or many-to-one mapping, and is referred to as
a multivalued function. The inverse relation (a generalization of the notion of inverse function) of this
multivalued function is indeed a function in the normal sense, and the Cox and Huang [1989] approach
still applies.2.A Appendix 31
The optimal investment strategy
By substituting (2.12) into (2.4) and after some straightforward but somewhat tedious
calculus, one can obtain the optimal wealth at time 0 ≤ t < T
Wt = θ2e
















Γ(t)[Φ(d2(ξ3)) − Φ(d2(ξ2))], (2.13)
where Φ( ) denotes the cumulative standard normal distribution function, and
d1(x) =

















Applying the Itˆ o rule to the expression of Wt (2.13), one can describe the optimal wealth
process by a stochastic diﬀerential equation. Alternatively, one can in the Black-Scholes
economy characterize any self-ﬁnancing wealth process by the following stochastic diﬀer-
ential equation
dWt = (r + wtσλ)Wtdt + wtσWtdZt,
where wt denotes the stock weight at time t. Equating the diﬀusion parts of the two
above-mentioned stochastic diﬀerential equations leads to the the optimal weight of risky





















































where φ( ) is the standard normal density function.32 Welfare Analysis of Conditional Indexation Schemes
The optimal proﬁle of pension rights in the special case where
γ = 0 and κ → ∞





−∞ for W < θ1,
aW + b for θ1 ≤ W ≤ θ2,
aθ2 + b for W ≥ θ2,
(2.14)
As in the more general case, using the equivalent martingale approach of Cox and Huang




θ1 for ξT ≥ ξk,















where Φ−1( ) denotes the inverse of the standard normal cumulative distribution function.
Given the one-to-one relation between the pricing kernel and the the stock index value




θ1 for ST ≤ K,
θ2 for ST > K, (2.15)
where













The dynamics of the strike and lower threshold in conditional
indexation
Version I









Conditioning on the stock index value St at time t, ST can be expressed as











where Z is a standard normal variable. Inserting the expression into (2.17) generates the
dynamics of the strike price as expressed by (2.8). Applying the Itˆ o rule to (2.8), one2.A Appendix 33
obtains the characterization of the strike price by stochastic diﬀerential equation (2.6).
Consider a European digital option which pays 0 at T if the stock price is lower than the
strike, and pays 1 otherwise. We allow the strike Kt to change over time, and denote the
pricing formula of the digital option by F(Kt,St,t). Given the dynamics of the strike
price from version I of conditional indexation, the pricing formula of the digital option
F(K
(1)
t ,St,t) is simply a deterministic function F1(t)
F(K
(1)













For the dynamics of the guaranteed level, consider the updating in discrete time ﬁrst.
At time t, the pension value is








At the time t + ∆t before applying conditional indexation, the pension value changes to








The pension value after conditional indexation is
W
′








Since the conditional indexation does not change the pension value at time t + ∆t, we
have Wt+∆t = W ′
t+∆t and then the adjustment of θ
(1)












t+∆t,St+∆t,t + ∆t) − F(K
(1)





One can decompose the term F(K
(1)
t+∆t,St+∆t,t + ∆t) − F(K
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For the ﬁrst term on the right-hand side of (2.18), we have
F(K
(1)
t+∆t,St+∆t,t + ∆t) − F(K
(1)




















∆t + o(∆t), (2.19)
where o( ) denotes the higher order term. For the second on the right-hand side of (2.18),
F(K
(1)
t ,St+∆t,t + ∆t) − F(K
(1)
t ,St,t), the diﬀerence is taken on the basis of ﬁxed strike
price, and hence is the diﬀerence of the value of a digital option with ﬁxed strike price.







































Because dF2(St,t) is equal to F(K
(1)
t ,St+∆t,t + ∆t) − F(K
(1)
t ,St,t), and because for
K = K
(1)
t , d(K,t) = d(1)(t), one can write
F(K
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which in continuous time converges to (2.7). Thus at last we obtain the stochastic
diﬀerential equation characterizing the evolution of the guaranteed level in continuous
time.
Next we shall show that the guaranteed level reaches the intention level before time








, X0 = θ2 − θ1,0.2.A Appendix 35


















Yt = Y0 + λ(
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T − t −
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T) + 1



































T−sdZs is a Brownian motion deﬁned for 0 ≤ s < ∞. The time-changed stochastic
process is




















ˆ Xs = 0,
where the notation “p-lim” denotes convergence in probability. Thus, for the stochastic
process θ1,t deﬁned by
dθ1,t =






, θ1,0 = θ1 (2.21)
it holds that p-limt↑T θ1,t = θ2.
We now turn to the case in which θ1,t is deﬁned by (2.7). Multiplying the right
hand side of (2.21) by
φ(d(1)(t))
1−Φ(d(1)(t)) will result in (2.7). Given that the term
φ(d(1)(t))
1−Φ(d(1)(t))
is continuous, and tends to a ﬁnite constant as time approaches T, it also holds that
p-limt↑T θ1,t = θ2 in this case.
Version II
In this appendix, we shall motivate the rule of conditional indexation as given by (2.9)








Next we show that the running-maximum relationship holds for any time t+∆t through
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and the strike price is updated by
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Thus we have proven that for discrete updating, the strike price from version II is the
running maximum of that from version I, which motivates the rule given by (2.9) in
continuous time.
Expected utility computation
The appendix shows the computation of the expected utility of the schemes studied
in Section 2.5 with respect to the piecewise power utility. For the scheme with the
ratchet conditional indexation, the expected utility can be obtained through Monte Carlo
simulations. For the other schemes, analytical formulae can be obtained through integral
calculus.
















































Γ(0)[Φ(c2(ξ3)) − Φ(c2(ξ2))],2.A Appendix 37
where
c1(x) =
























The expected utility of the digital scheme which is optimal for the utility with
κ = ∞ and γ = 0
As is shown in Appendix 2.A, if the benchmark utility function (2.2) has the following
parameter values: κ = ∞ and γ = 0, then the optimal pension proﬁle reduces to a digital













where p is determined by (2.5).
The expected utility of the constant-proportion strategy
Let γc denote the coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion underlying a constant-proportion
strategy. The stock weight of the constant-proportion strategy is
w
c =
  − r
γcσ2 ,
and the pension rights are
W
c
T = W0 exp
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Valuation of Contingent Pension
Liabilities and Implementation of
Conditional Indexation
3.1 Introduction
In the insurance and pension industries, some contracts are formulated in such a way that
the payoﬀ to beneﬁciaries is linked to the ﬁnancial status of insurers or pension funds. In
insurance, a typical example is given by participating life insurance policies (also known
as with-proﬁts policies), which provide a guaranteed return and allow beneﬁciaries to
participate in the proﬁt of a life insurance company through a proﬁt-sharing scheme.
Participating contracts make up a signiﬁcant part of the life insurance market in many
industrial countries. In the ﬁeld of pensions, there exists a similar practice known as
conditional indexation, which links the pension beneﬁts to the ﬁnancial position of a
pension fund. The practice of conditional indexation has been adopted by many pension
funds in the Netherlands in recent years, and its introduction is under discussion in the
UK.
As already stated in the Introduction, a conditional indexation scheme typically grant
inﬂation compensation to its participants on the basis of its funding ratio, the ratio of
pension asset value to pension liability value. In particular, the level of compensation
for inﬂation (indexation) applied in a certain year is determined according to a rule of
the following form: (i) if the funding ratio is below some threshold (e. g. 110%), there is
no indexation to inﬂation; (ii) if the funding ratio is above some upper threshold (e. g.
140%), the pension rights will be fully indexed to inﬂation; (iii) if the ratio is in between,
some intermediate level of indexation will apply. The rule that links the funding ratio
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to the indexation decision is know as a “policy ladder”. In practice, such rules are also
subject to the discretion of pension board.
Against the backdrop of the international move promoted by the International Ac-
counting Standards Board (IASB) towards the market-based, fair value accountancy stan-
dard, the valuation of these contracts contingent on the ﬁnancial position of insurers and
pension funds have become a subject of increasing interest both to academics and practi-
tioners. For participating life insurance contracts, the valuation has been analyzed in the
contingent claim pricing framework by a number of recent papers, for example, Aase and
Persson [1997], Grosen and Jørgensen [2002], Bauer, Kiesel, Kling, and Ruß [2006], Bal-
lotta, Haberman, and Wang [2006], Gatzert and Kling [2007], and Kleinow and Willder
[2007]. In this chapter, we consider the valuation of conditionally indexed pension lia-
bilities in the same framework. We also note that a good understanding of how to value
this type of pension liabilities is also needed in dealing with pension rights transfer of
conditional indexation schemes.
The conditional indexation of pension beneﬁt may lead to some interesting and chal-
lenging issues in the market valuation of pension liabilities. First of all, the value of
liabilities and the funding ratio have to be determined simultaneously for conditional
indexation schemes. The reason is that the indexation level for the current year depends
on the funding ratio via a policy ladder, and at the same time, the indexation level has
a feedback eﬀect on the liability value and in turn on the funding ratio through market
valuation. In other words, a circularity problem arises in the valuation of conditionally
indexed pension liabilities:
Funding ratio = Asset
Liability
market valuation
← − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − →
conditional indexation
Indexation level
Therefore, the determinations of the indexation level, liability value, and funding ratio
are interdependent, and hence need to be addressed simultaneously through looking for a
coherent solution in the sense that the indexation level and the funding ratio are consistent
with each other with respect to the policy ladder and the market valuation approach.
Another complication arises from the intertemporal dimension of market valuation of
pension liabilities. The lion’s share of pension liabilities is from pension rights payable in
the future. Under conditional indexation, the future pension payments can be thought
of as collar-structured contingent payoﬀs: the payoﬀs are subject to ﬂoors and caps de-
termined by minimum and maximum indexation, and contingent on the future funding3.1 Introduction 41
ratio. In principle, one can reach a market valuation of the liabilities using contingent
payoﬀ pricing techniques developed along the lines of Black and Scholes [1973] and Mer-
ton [1973]. A complication resulting from conditional indexation is that pension payments
to be made at diﬀerent time points are inter-dependent. To see the intertemporal depen-
dence, consider a pension fund that is to make pension payment at only two future dates
(i. e. there are two European options with diﬀerent expiry dates). The intertemporal
dependence may arise in two ways. Firstly, the ﬁrst pension payment, which can be said
to be the actual payoﬀ of the ﬁrst option in the language of ﬁnancial derivatives, will
reduce the pension asset value. As a consequence, it has an impact on the future funding
ratio, in terms of which the second payment (or the second option) is deﬁned. Therefore
the actual payoﬀ of the ﬁrst option has an impact on the underlying of the second, and
in turn an impact on the valuation of the second. Due to the intertemporal dependence,
these two options need to be considered together for their valuation, rather than one by
one as the usual case of pricing a portfolio of options where the underlying dynamics is
(or is assumed to be) not aﬀected by the exercise of component options.
The second source of the intertemporal dependence is the practice that indexation is
accumulated over time. For example, if participants are granted full indexation in 2005
and retirees receive pension beneﬁts increased by the inﬂation, then the minimum amount
of pension in 2006 is the amount paid in the previous year whatever the indexation level
is decided for 2006 (assuming positive inﬂation). In the language of options, the year-
by-year accumulation of conditional indexation leads to a case where the actual payoﬀ
of earlier options aﬀects the parameters characterizing later options (the lower bound of
pension rights in this context), i.e. payoﬀ depends on state variables other the current
funding ratio. In other words, the parameters which deﬁne the options are speciﬁed by
some function (mechanism), but not speciﬁed as a known number as in most cases in
options pricing.
When the indexation is accumulated year by year, referred to as the cumulative case in
the following, there exists intertemporal dependence through both the underlying and the
parameters. In comparison with the intertemporal dependence through the underlying,
the dependence through the parameters results in stronger path-dependence in option
pricing, and hence leads to a new dimension of complication in the value of pension
liabilities as will be shown below. To distinguish these two types of intertemporal depen-
dence, we discuss a case in which indexation is not accumulated and hence there only42 Valuation and Implementation of Conditional Indexation
exists the intertemporal dependence through the underlying. And this case is referred to
as the noncumulative case in this chapter.
Note that the circularity problem arises from our assumption that the funding ratio
used for indexation decision is computed using the true liability value. By this assump-
tion, we actually impose the requirement that the funding ratio used for indexation
decisions is also reliable as an indicator of the ﬁnancial soundness of pension funds. For
this reason, we refer to as the consistent implementation of conditional indexation the
case where the funding ratio used in indexation decisions is based on the true value of
liabilities.
A way to avoid solving circularity problems is to replace the true value of liabilities
(including the value of the indexation options) by a value that is easier to compute, such
as the value of the liabilities without indexation, and to assume that indexation will be
based on the funding ratio as computed from that value. Current practice at pension
funds implementing conditional indexation is actually of this type. Similar assumptions
are made in the recent papers Nijman and Koijen [2006] and de Jong [2008], who address
the valuation of the liabilities of conditional indexation schemes. Both papers focus on the
inﬂation risk stemming from the link to inﬂation which is uncertain, while abstracting
from the circularity problem and intertemporal dependence inherent in the consistent
implementation of conditional indexation. Similar to the current practice of conditional
indexation, proﬁt-sharing decisions in participating life insurance contracts are based on
the book value, rather than the market value, of such contracts, and hence there does
not exist the circularity problem either. So in the analysis of participating contracts as
carried out in the papers mentioned earlier, no circularity problems need to be solved.
The procedure in which a proxy of funding ratio, rather than that based on the true
value of liabilities, is used for indexation decisions is referred to as the proxy-based imple-
mentation of conditional indexation in this chapter. Though circumventing the circularity
problem, this type of implementation leads to another complication. The funding ratio
proxy assuming a ﬁxed indexation level may not reﬂect the ﬁnancial soundness of pension
funds from the perspective of contingent claims pricing, since in fact the indexation lev-
els to be decided in the future are contingent and varied. Therefore the implementation
using a proxy calls for two funding ratios in the system: a proxy for indexation decisions,
and the actual funding ratio for measuring the ﬁnancial soundness. In the absence of
the circularity problem, the actual values can be obtained by applying classical option3.2 Consistent implementation and computational procedure 43
pricing techniques. As will be shown below, for a given funding ratio proxy, the actual
funding diﬀers because the investment policies of pension funds diﬀer, because the policy
ladders diﬀer, and because the demographic composition diﬀers. It may be a point of
concern from the regulatory perspective, if only the funding ratio proxy assuming a ﬁxed
indexation level is reported.
Presumably, the very fundamental idea underlying conditional indexation is that a
pension fund pays more to its participants when it possesses more vis-` a-vis its liability.
Because a ﬁxed-indexation proxy presumes indexation to be constant, but the actual in-
dexation will be contingent and varied, a ﬁxed-indexation proxy is hardly a right measure
of how much a fund possesses vis-` a-vis its liability. Therefore the proxy-based implemen-
tation in principle cannot ensure that this fundamental idea is actually enforced, and
it allows the scenario that a pension fund pays out more even when it has less relative
to its liability. Given the inconsistency between the intended idea and the actual im-
plementation, one might ask what consequences the proxy-based implementation may
have.
We proceed as follows. Section 3.2 presents the model and the computational proce-
dure for the consistent implementation. To illustrate the computational procedure and
show the impact of investment strategies and policy ladders on the liability value, we
present some numerical examples in Section 3.3. Assuming the proxy-based implemen-
tation, Section 3.4 shows how the discrepancy between the funding ratio proxy and the
actual funding ratio depends on investment policies and policy ladders. Some concluding
observations are in Section 5.6.
3.2 Consistent implementation and computational pro-
cedure
3.2.1 The economy and the pension fund
Although the computation procedure we present below applies in more general settings,
we consider for simplicity the standard Black-Scholes economy. In particular,
• the only risk factor is stock market risk, and it is traded through a stock index St
following geometric Brownian motion
dSt =  Stdt + σStdZt,44 Valuation and Implementation of Conditional Indexation
where   and σ are the constant drift and volatility parameters, and Zt is the
standard Brownian motion.
• The riskless asset is a cash bond with constant interest rate r, whose price, Bt,
changes according to
dBt = rBtdt.
• The inﬂation rate, ρ, is constant.
We consider a pension fund which is liable for making pension payments at N time
points: T1,...,TN, and which will be liquidated at the terminal time TN. In the noncu-
mulative case, the payment at Ti (i = 1,...,N) is subject to a decision to be made at
Ti on the indexation level applied over the period from the initial time T0 to the current
time Ti. In the cumulative case, however, the indexation decision at time Ti is made
with respect to the inﬂation over the immediately previous period from Ti−1 to Ti. Thus
the payment at Ti is determined by the current indexation at time Ti, as well as by all
previous indexation decisions made times from T1 through Ti−1. We are now at time t
(< T1) and to compute the liability value and funding ratio. Note that the model is based
on projected beneﬁt obligations rather than accrued beneﬁt obligations.
The indexation decision is made according to a policy ladder, a formula that produces
a indexation level applied over a certain period to the pension rights paid within a short
time (usually one year in practice) on the basis of the current funding ratio.1 Given the
short interval between the time when the indexation is determined on the basis of the
current funding ration, and the time when the pension rights with the decided indexation
level are actually paid out, it is reasonable to model the policy ladder as a formula that
determines the pension rights paid immediately, denoted by Lc, on the basis of the current
funding ratio.
As mentioned in the introduction, the policy ladders in practice distinguish three







Lℓ for FR < Kℓ,
Lℓ + β(FR − Kℓ) for Kℓ ≤ FR ≤ Ku,
Lu for FR > Ku,
(3.1)
1In an average-salary scheme, the indexation level also apply to active workers, but we abstract from
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where FR is the current funding ratio, Ku and Kℓ are the upper and lower thresholds of
funding ratio, Lu and Lℓ are the pension rights with maximum and minimum indexation
levels, and β =
Lu−Lℓ
Ku−Kℓ to ensure that the function is continuous. For ﬁxed Lu, Lℓ and
Kℓ, the value of Ku (or β) determines how generous the policy ladder is. Note that in
the noncumulative case, Lu and Lℓ are known parameters while in the cumulative case,
they are variables to be determined.
The pension fund is assumed to adopt a constant-proportion investment strategy.
That is, the pension fund keeps the asset value invested in stocks (represented here by




We consider the consistent implementation, where the funding ratio used in indexation
conditions is computed based on the true value of the liabilities. For the computation of
the funding ratio, we can decompose the pension liability value at any time t into two
components: the value of pension right paid immediately Lc
t, and the value of pension
rights to be paid in the future, denoted by L
f
t . We can write
FR =
A
Lc + Lf , (3.2)
where A is the current asset value, and the time subscript t is dropped for simplicity.
The distinction between Lc and Lf relies on the time when the liability value and funding
ratio are computed. For instance, Lc is zero and all the liability value is captured by Lf
at time t, whereas Lc is the actual payment and Lf is zero at the terminal time TN.
Equations (3.1) and (3.2) characterize the circularity problem in the consistent im-
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for (Lℓ + Lf)Kℓ ≤ A ≤ (Lu + Lf)Ku,
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The above equation solves the circularity problem by ﬁnding the coherent solution in the
sense that the pension rights paid immediately and the current funding are consistent.
We shall describe the procedure to compute the liability value at t, and then through
some numerical example to show how the liability value depends on the asset, and the
impact of investment strategies and policy ladders on the liability value and funding ratio.
First, let us introduce the following notations we need:
Aτ: the asset value at time τ before pension payment
A′
τ: the asset value at time τ after pension payment
Lτ: the liability value of the pension fund at time τ before pension
payment if there is any
Lτ( ): the function associating the state variable(s) to Lτ
Lℓ
τ: the pension paid at τ with minimum indexation
Lu
τ: the pension paid at τ with maximum indexation
Lc
τ: the pension made immediately from the vantage point at time τ
Lc
τ( ): the function relating the state variable(s) to Lc
τ
Lf
τ: the pension to be made in the future from the vantage point
at time τ
Lf
τ( ): the function relating the state variable(s) to Lf
τ
G: unconditional nominal beneﬁt
The liability value at time t is computed using backward method. We note that
the computation procedure is similar to that for pricing Bermudan options. The main
diﬀerence is that for Bermudan options, we solve an optimization problem at each early
exercise date, whereas for the liability valuation, we solve the circularity problem at each
pension payment date. We shall distinguish two types of intertemporal dependence. For
ease of exposition, we start with the noncumulative case, and then address the cumulative
case.
The noncumulative case
Observe ﬁrst that in the noncumulative case, the pensions paid at time Ti (i = 1,...,N)
with minimum and maximum indexation are given by
L
ℓ
Ti = G, L
u
Ti = Gexp[ρ(Ti − T0)].3.2 Consistent implementation and computational procedure 47
The recursive approach starts from the terminal time TN, when the pension fund makes
the last payment, Lc
TN, and then it is liquidated. It is assumed that at the terminal time,
the deﬁcit short of the guaranteed level is made up for a third party, for instance, the
pension regulator, whereas the surplus beyond the full indexation pension payoﬀ will go
to the third party for free. Given L
f
TN = 0, we can obtain Lc
TN by applying (3.3) to solve
































Ku−Kℓ . As can be seen from the above equation, the last payment is






Now move one period back to TN−1, when the second last payment is made. From
the vantage point at TN−1, the last payment can be thought of as an option written
on the pension asset value. Since the fund follows constant-proportion strategies in the
Black-Scholes economy, ATN follows a lognormal distribution conditional on A′
TN−1 at















where z follows the standard normal distribution. Please note that A′
TN−1 is the pension




TN−1 = ATN−1 − L
c
TN−1.
The option value, i. e. L
f
TN−1, can be obtained using option pricing techniques, for example















with the boundary condition
π(TN,ATN) = L
c
TN. (3.6b)48 Valuation and Implementation of Conditional Indexation
And L
f
TN−1 is given by π(TN−1,A′
TN−1). The PDE (3.6) does not have an analytical
solution in general. Nevertheless, either through numerical methods like ﬁnite diﬀer-




















With the above functional expression for L
f
TN−1, one can solve for the time-TN−1 payment
Lc













































Ku−Kℓ . The above equation characterizes the circularity problem
at time T1 stemming from the conditional indexation. Assuming unique solvability of
the above equation,2 one can, through numerical methods, solve the equation to obtain
Lc






















So one can also write LTN−1 as a function of ATN−1:
LTN−1 := LTN−1(ATN−1) (3.9)
Thus we succeed in moving one period back from time TN to TN−1. Repeating this
procedure, we can move back period by period till time T1, and the total liability value
at time T1 is written as
LT1 := LT1(AT1) (3.10)
2Unique solvability of the circularity equations at every step of the recursion is not easy to verify,
since the involved functions are deﬁned implicitly. We take the unique solvability as an assumption here.3.2 Consistent implementation and computational procedure 49
Therefore we can come back to the current time t. For the current liability value Lt,
one can, through numerical methods, solve the PDE (3.6a) with the boundary condition
π(T1,AT1) = LT1(AT1). Finally we arrive at the current liability value and funding ratio:




We summarize the computational procedure. The recursion starts from the terminal
time TN, and obtains the amount of the last payment as a function of the asset value
as Equation (3.5) by solving the circularity problem at that time point. Then move one
period back to the second last payment date TN−1. Using options pricing techniques,
the value at TN−1 of the last payment can be formulated in the form of (3.7), with
which the amount of the ﬁrst payment can be written as a function of the asset value
as Equation (3.8) by solving the circularity problem at TN−1. Thus the total liability
value as a function of the asset value is given by Equation (3.9). Following the same
procedure that moves from time TN to TN−1, we can move period by period back till
time T1, and express the time T1 liability value as (3.10). Moving back the valuation date
t, and applying options pricing techniques, we eventually obtain the liability value and
the funding ratio as in Equation (3.11).
The cumulative case
The practice that indexation is accumulated over time makes the minimum pension
beneﬁt paid by pension funds in certain year dependent on the indexation decisions
made in previous years, or equivalently on the pension beneﬁt actually paid in previous
years. In the multiple-period model, we formulate this type of intertemporal dependence
through letting the lower bound of the pension payment in a certain period depend on
the actual payment in the previous period. In particular, the lower and upper bounds of
the pension payment are deﬁned recursively as follows,
L
ℓ
T1 = G, L
u









Ti−1 exp[ρ(Ti − Ti−1)], for i = 2,...,N.
Because of the recursive nature of the pension payment, the pension payment in a certain
period is dependent on the actual payments in previous periods. Thus additional state
variables need to be introduced to address the added intertemporal dependence arising
from the cumulative case. The required number of additional state variables depends on50 Valuation and Implementation of Conditional Indexation
the structure of the pension fund, especially the number of generations of participants in
the fund. For ease of exposition, we distinguish a single-generation fund and a multiple-
generation fund, and address the single-generation fund ﬁrst.
Consider the pension fund with a single generation. The computational procedure
also works backwards and starts from the last payment date TN. The solution of the































Ku−Kℓ . Because Lℓ
TN and Lu
TN are dependent on the actual payment in
the previous period, Lc








Observe that in comparison to the corresponding equation (3.5) in the noncumulative
case, Equation (3.12) includes the actual payment in the previous period as an additional
state variable.
Now move one period back to TN−1, when the second last payment is made. In
principle, one can apply the options pricing techniques to obtain L
f
TN−1 as a function of
Lc
TN−1 and A′





















With the above functional expression for L
f
TN−1, one can solve for the second last payment
Lc



















































Ku−Kℓ . Assuming unique solvability of the above equation, one can
solve the equation to obtain Lc








for the reason that the lower and upper boundaries of pension payment at time TN−1,
Lℓ
TN−1 and Lu
TN−1, are dependent on the actual payment at time TN−2, Lc
TN−2. As such,



























Repeating this procedure, we can move back period by period till time T2, when the




Then we move one period back from T2 to T1. Note that the lower and upper bound-
aries of pension payment at time T1, Lℓ
T1 and Lu
T1, are known parameters rather than
unknown variables. Therefore the recursion from T2 to T1 leads to the time-T1 liability
value given by
LT1 := LT1(AT1). (3.16)
At last we can come back to the current time t. For the current liability value Lt,
one can, through numerical methods, solve the PDE (3.6a) with the boundary condition
π(T1,AT1) = LT1(AT1). Finally we arrive at the current liability value and funding ratio:




In comparison with the noncumulative case, the one-generation pension fund with
cumulative indexation requires one additional state variable for the computation. This
computational procedure can be generalized to a multiple-generation fund with cumu-
lative indexation by including the current pension payments (or the current promised
payments) of every generation of the participants as state variables. In the cumulative52 Valuation and Implementation of Conditional Indexation
case of a multiple-generation fund, however, the required number of state variables in-
creases with the number of generations of participants in the fund, in order to carry
relevant information about the diﬀerent indexation applied to diﬀerent generations. A
realistic model of the cumulative case needs a large number of state variables (up to 80)
to carry the relevant information on indexation decisions over time.
With such realistic modeling of the cumulative case, the valuation of conditionally
indexed pension liabilities in the consistent implementation leads to a computational task
of high dimension. The model can be solved in principle through backward recursion as in
our stylized model, but a major computational problem is the dimension of the state space
which may be beyond the computational capacity usually available. The dimensionality
problem cannot be solved by standard Monte Carlo methods since the liability value
is needed to determine what indexation decisions are made; adaptations akin to Monte
Carlo methods for American option pricing may be possible but are not addressed in this
chapter.
3.3 Numerical illustration
In this section, we present some numerical exercises in the cumulative case. We consider
the simplest case where there are two pension payments (N = 2). In the numerical
illustration, the following parameter values are assumed:
r = 3%,   = 7%, σ = 20%, ρ = 4%, α ∈ {0.25,0.50,0.75}
T0 = 0, t = 9, T1 = 10, T2 = 20
Kℓ = 110%, Ku ∈ {115%,140%,160%}
L
ℓ






3.3.1 The impact of investment strategies
To see the impact of the aggressiveness of investment strategies, we ﬁx the policy ladder
(Kℓ = 110% and Ku = 140%), and consider three stock weights α ∈ {25%,50%,75%}.
Before looking into the liability value and funding ratio of the conditional indexation
schemes, let us recall some deﬁning properties of deﬁned-beneﬁts (DB) and deﬁned-
contribution (DC) schemes as reﬂected by liability value and funding ratio. For a pure
DB scheme, because of the bond-like property of pension beneﬁts, the liability value is3.3 Numerical illustration 53










Panel A: Liability value




































Panel B: Funding ratio
























Figure 3.1: Liability value and funding ratio at time t for diﬀerent investment
policies This ﬁgure shows both the liability value (the left panel) and the funding ratio (the right
panel) at time t as a function of the then asset value for three asset mixes: the stock weight is assumed
to be 25% (the solid line), 50% (the dashed line), and 75% (the dotted line). The bold lines are for the
ﬁnancial measure on the basis of the FTK requirement, which will be discussed in Section 3.4.
independent of changes of pension asset value, and the funding ratio is therefore a linear
function of the pension asset value. On the other hand, for a typical DC scheme, the
liability value is equal to (i. e. a linear function of) the pension asset value whereas the
funding ratio is constant at 100%.
As can be seen from the behavior of its liability value and funding ratio illustrated in
Figure 3.1, conditional indexation schemes are neither typical of DB nor of DC, but strike
some balance between the two stereotypes. If the asset value is either very low or very
high, the liability values for all the three diﬀerent investment policy show little or even
no dependence of the asset value, bearing the hallmark of DB schemes. The same point
can be seen from the funding ratio of the conditional indexation scheme as it approaches
a linear function of the asset value for both ends of the asset value domain as shown in
the ﬁgure. In contrast, for the intermediate domain of asset values, say between 200 and
400, the conditional indexation scheme bears a close resemblance to DC schemes, in that
the liability value is increasing with the asset value, and the funding ratio is insensitive
to the variation of asset value.
Therefore the practice of conditional indexation has the eﬀect of stabilizing the fund-
ing ratio through introducing a DC element to the originally DB system. The magnitude54 Valuation and Implementation of Conditional Indexation








Panel A: Value of the first payment











































Panel B: Value of the second payment










































Figure 3.2: Value of the two pension payments to be made at T1 and T2 This
ﬁgure shows the liability value of the ﬁrst payment(the upper panel) and the second payment (the lower
panel) at time t as a function of the asset value for three asset mixes: the stock weight is assumed to be
25% (the solid line), 50% (the dashed line), and 75% (the dotted line). The vertical dash-dotted line is
corresponding to asset value equal to 350.
of the stabilizing eﬀect, however, depends on the investment policy. The stability of
funding ratio in the intermediate region of asset values becomes more pronounced with
a lower stock weight, for in that case the curve for the funding ratio is ﬂatter as shown
in the ﬁgure. An intuitive explanation is as follows. In comparison with a scheme with
a high stock weight, a low stock weight scheme has less volatility of asset value. For a
conservative asset mix, a given amount of asset value increase implies an increased future
asset value with more certainty than for an aggressive asset mix. And hence a larger pen-
sion increase in the form of an increased indexation level can be granted to participants,
which implies a larger increase in pension liabilities. That is, the liability value of is more
sensitive to the variation of asset value for a conservative asset mix. Translated into the
funding ratio, it implies that the funding ratio has greater stability when the investment
strategy is less risky.
Whether increased riskiness of asset mix will raise or lower the liability value depends
on the current asset value. In particular, when the asset value is low, say equal to3.3 Numerical illustration 55
200, a higher stock weight increases the liability value. In contrast, when the asset
value is high, say equal to 400, a higher stock weight decreases the liability value. The
dependence on the current asset value stems from the collar structure of pension rights
under conditional indexation. A higher stock weight may enhance the probability of
granting greater-than-the-minimum indexation, and increase the liability value. On the
other hand, it is also possible that an increased stock weight dampens the possibility of
the maximum indexation, and hence decreases the liability value. The balance of the two
countervailing eﬀects depends on the current asset value. The increasing eﬀect dominates
for low asset values due to the guaranteed pension ﬂoor, whereas the decreasing eﬀect
prevails for high asset values because of the full indexation ceiling of pension rights. At
some intermediate values of asset these two eﬀects compensate each other, making the
liability value insusceptible to changes of asset mix. The impact of investment policy can
also been expressed in terms of the funding ratio: a raised stock weight decreases the
funding ratio at low asset values, and increase the funding ratio at high asset values.
The pension liability consists of the two payments to be made in the future in this
example, and the liability value can be decomposed into two components: the value of
the early payment, and that of the late payment. To analyze the impact of investment
policy on the two components can lead one to see how the change of investment policy
results in intertemporal redistribution. Figure 3.2 shows the values of the two payments
as a function of the asset value for the three investment policies. When the current
asset is either very high or very low, say 200 and 450, the change of asset mix drives the
two components in the same direction. In contrast, for some intermediate asset values,
the change of asset mix decreases the value of one payment, but increases the value
of another. For instance, consider the asset value equal to 350, where a rise in stock
weight will increase the value of the ﬁrst payment, but decrease the value of the second
considerably. That is to say, the improved growth potential from higher stock weight is
captured by the ﬁrst payment preemptively, leaving the second payment only a loss. If
the ﬁrst payment is interpreted as the pension rights of an old generation, and the second
as that of a young generation, then it implies that the investment policy has implications
for inter-generational redistribution.56 Valuation and Implementation of Conditional Indexation










Panel A: Liability value




































Panel B: Funding ratio
























Figure 3.3: Liability value and funding ratio at time t for diﬀerent policy ladders
This ﬁgure shows both the liability value (the left panel) and the funding ratio (the right panel) at time
t as a function of the then asset value for three policy ladders: Ku is assumed to be 1.15 (the solid line),
1.40 (the dashed line), and 1.60 (the dotted line). The bold lines are on the basis of valuation following
the FTK requirement, which will be discussed in Section 3.4.
3.3.2 The impact of policy ladders
To see the impact of the policy ladders, we ﬁx the stock weight (α = 0.5) and vary the
threshold of funding ratio for full indexation: Ku ∈ {115%,140%,160%}. To the extent
that a lower value of Ku implies that it is easier for participants to receive full indexation,
the three values for Ku are used to characterize how generous the policy ladder is.
As would be anticipated, a more generous policy ladder, ceteris paribus, results in a
greater liability value and hence a lower funding ratio whatever the current asset value
is (Figure 3.3). Another interesting point is that the funding ratio is more stable under
a more generous policy ladder as the curve of funding ratio is ﬂatter in such a case. An
intuitive explanation is that a more generous policy ladder makes the granted indexation
level and hence the liability value more responsive to the variation of asset value, which
implies more stability of the funding ratio.
As Figure 3.4 shows, the values of both payments are increasing with the generosity of
policy ladder, irrespective of the current asset value. However, generally the ﬁrst payment
seems to beneﬁt more from a generous policy ladder than the second does, reﬂecting the
preemptive advantage of the ﬁrst payment over the second.3.4 Comparison to the proxy-based implementation 57








Panel A: Value of the first payment














































Panel B: Value of the second payment







































Figure 3.4: Liability value and funding ratio at time t for diﬀerent policy ladders
This ﬁgure shows the liability value of the ﬁrst payment(the upper panel) and the second payment (the
lower panel) at time t as a function of the asset value for three asset mixes: Ku is assumed to be 1.15
(the solid line), 1.40 (the dashed line), and 1.60 (the dotted line).
3.4 Comparison to the proxy-based implementation
In the consistent implementation discussed above, the funding ratio used for indexation
decisions is ﬁnancially valid, and hence it is a reliable indicator in assessing the ﬁnancial
status of the pension fund. (The funding ratio obtained in this way will be referred to
as the “consistent funding ratio” in the following.) In the valuation of pension liabilities,
the circularity problem needs to solved to keep the consistency of the resultant funding
ratio between its role as the basis of indexation and its role as an indicator of ﬁnancial
solvency. The current practice of conditional indexation is diﬀerent though. Indexation
decisions are made on the basis of a proxy of funding ratio for which the liability value
is computed assuming a ﬁxed indexation, typically zero indexation.3 The proxy-based
implementation avoids the circularity problem inherent in the consistent implementation.
3According to the current Dutch pension regulation (FTK), the liability value is computed on the
basis of the guaranteed pension rights only, excluding the contingent rights from conditional indexation.
See http://docs.szw.nl/pdf/35/2004/35 2004 349957.pdf (in Dutch).58 Valuation and Implementation of Conditional Indexation
A caveat for the current practice is that the zero-indexation proxy used for indexa-
tion decisions may be misleading in assessing the ﬁnancial status of pension funds. From
the perspective of market valuation, it is straightforward that the zero-indexation proxy
overstates the ﬁnancial solvency of pension funds, and hence is an overestimate of the
“actual” funding ratio, as long as it is possible to grant indexation to participants. Nev-
ertheless, one may defend the validity of the zero-indexation proxy as an indicator of
ﬁnancial solvency by the argument that the proxy, if being read with some “discount”,
can still make sense. As will be shown below, however, the proxy overestimates the latent
actual funding ratio in a complicated manner, making such discounting rather diﬃcult.
Moreover, the funding ratio computed on the basis of any ﬁxed level of indexation is
not a reliable indicator of ﬁnancial soundness, because the indexation levels decided in
the future are contingent and varied. Therefore for the purpose of assessing the ﬁnancial
status of pension funds using this implementation, the actual funding ratio needs to be
computed and used. In the following, we shall address the market valuation of the liability
and the computation of the actual funding ratio in the proxy-based implementation.
A diﬀerent funding ratio used for indexation decisions, ceteris paribus, leads to dif-
ferent indexation decisions and hence to a diﬀerent pension proﬁle. The zero-indexation
proxy is of course diﬀerent from the consistent funding ratio, so the scheme resulting
from zero-indexation proxy, referred to as the the “ZIP scheme” hereafter, is diﬀerent
from that generated by the consistent implementation. The question we face is what the
actual funding ratio of the ZIP scheme is. It is worth noting that the consistent funding
ratio is not the answer since it is the actual funding ratio for a diﬀerent pension scheme.
To obtain the actual funding ratio of the ZIP scheme, we need to know the zero-
indexation proxy ﬁrst, for the reason that it is on the basis of the zero-indexation proxy
that indexation decisions and pension rights are determined. We still work in the two-
payment model. With the assumption of zero-indexation, the (proxy) liability value at
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Their values as a function of the asset value are shown in Figure 3.1 and 3.3. They are
of DB nature, and independent of investment policy and policy ladder. We assume that
the two indexation decisions at T1 and T2 are based on the two zero-indexation proxies3.4 Comparison to the proxy-based implementation 59
immediately before payments respectively. The zero-indexation proxies at T1 and T2 can
be computed in a similar way.
Given the way the indexation decisions are made and the way the proxies for the
indexation decisions are computed, one can obtain the actual funding ratio of ZIP schemes
by applying classical options pricing techniques. Key to the computation of the funding
ratio is the market valuation of pension liabilities. In this context, the valuation of
liabilities is to price two contingent pension payments at T1 and T2. Applying Monte
Carlo simulation methods, one can obtain the market value of the liability and the actual
funding ratio of the ZIP scheme.
Using the same parameter values as before, the upper panels in Figures 3.5 and 3.6
show the relation between the actual funding and the zero-indexation proxy of the ZIP
scheme. Because the zero-indexation proxy, as can be seen from (3.18), is a linear function
of the asset value, these two ﬁgures can also be interpreted as representing the actual
funding ratio as a function of the asset value. A striking point, as can be seen from
the downward-sloping section of some curves in the ﬁgures, is that an increase in the
zero-indexation proxy reduces the actual funding ratio for some investment strategies
and policy ladders. It is because an increase in the asset value, ceteris paribus, would
raise the ﬁrst payment, which in turn raise the lower bound of the second payment, and
the boosting eﬀect on both payments can raise the liability value to such an extent that
is greater than the increase in the asset value. It makes no sense, based solely on the
numerical exercises of a stylized model as used in this chapter, to rush to the conclusion
that a stock market crash and a dampened asset value should be welcomed with open
arms by pensions funds that wish to improve their ﬁnancial status. Nevertheless, it
highlights the fact that it is possible for an increase in the asset value to in eﬀect hurt
the actual funding ratio of a pension fund.
The existence of such a counterintuitive scenario is accounted for by two elements
inherent in the proxy-based implementation. One is the dynamic inconsistency of this
implementation. The very fundamental idea of conditional indexation is that a pension
fund pays more only when it possesses more vis-` a-vis its liability. The proxy-based
implementation is not able to ensure that this idea is realized, because a proxy of funding
ratio simply uses a “ﬁnancially incorrect” measure of the liability, and hence cannot tell
one whether a pension fund possesses more relative to its liability. There may exist
the case where a pension fund pays more when it actually possesses less relative to its60 Valuation and Implementation of Conditional Indexation


























































Panel A: the actual funding ratio as a function of the zero−indexation proxy




































Panel B: the Delta of the indexation option
Figure 3.5: The proxy-based implementation for diﬀerent stock weights In this
ﬁgure, Panel A shows the actual funding ratio at time t as a function of the zero-indexation proxy, and
Panel B shows the ﬁrst-order derivative of the actual liability value with respect to the asset value (the
Delta of the indexation option). The stock weight is assumed to be 25% (the solid line), 50% (the dashed
line), and 75% (the dotted line). The horizontal axes of both panels are set to correspond to each other.
zero-indexation proxy 1.00 1.10 1.20 1.40 1.60 1.80
0.97 1.00 0.99 0.96 1.00 1.04 Panel A 25%
0.99 1.06 1.10 1.15 1.20 1.24 investment policy:
0.95 0.97 0.97 0.96 1.00 1.07 α =     50%
0.97 1.04 1.09 1.16 1.21 1.25
0.92 0.95 0.96 0.97 1.02 1.09 75%
0.96 1.03 1.08 1.16 1.22 1.27
0.91 0.89 0.86 0.91 0.98 1.05 Panel B 115%
0.97 1.03 1.07 1.11 1.13 1.15 policy ladder:
0.95 0.97 0.97 0.96 1.00 1.07 Ku =     140%
0.97 1.04 1.09 1.16 1.21 1.25
0.96 1.00 1.02 1.02 1.04 1.09 160%
0.98 1.05 1.11 1.19 1.25 1.31
Table 3.1: Comparison of funding ratios The table shows the actual funding ratio of the
ZIP scheme and the consistent funding ratio corresponding to various values of the zero-indexation proxy.
Panel A is for three stock weights with a ﬁxed policy ladder (Kℓ = 110%, and Ku = 140%) whereas
Panel B is for three policy ladders with a ﬁxed stock weight (α = 50%). The actual funding ratios of
the ZIP scheme are rendered in italics, and the consistent funding ratios in typewriter font.3.4 Comparison to the proxy-based implementation 61
liability. The other element contributing to this scenario is the accumulative practice
of indexation. It allows an indexation decision in a year to have “repercussions” on the
pension beneﬁt over many years that follows. For instance, if a participant receives 2%
indexation at the year of retirement, her pension beneﬁt in every year till her decease will
be raised by 2% compared to the case of no indexation. Paying 2% more in one year is
no big deal, but an increase of 2% in all 30 annual payments may have noticeable impact
on the liability value.
Therefore it is possible for a pension fund to grant participants too much indexation
in the sense that an increase in asset value leads to a lower actual funding ratio. The
possibility of over-indexation can also be seen from the Delta of the indexation option, i.
e. the ﬁrst-order derivative of the liability value as a function of the asset value. When the
Delta is greater than one, say 1.5, it means that an increase of 1 dollar in the asset value
leads to an increase of 1.5 dollars in the liability value stemming from more indexation.
As shown in the lower panels in Figures 3.5 and 3.6, the Delta is indeed larger than
one for some combinations of the current asset value, the stock weight, and the policy
ladder, corresponding to what we see from the behavior of the actual funding ratio in
the corresponding upper panels. It is intuitively clear that a more generous indexation
rule is more likely to have over-indexation (Figure 3.6). In a less intuitive way, Figure
3.5 implies that a pension fund with a more aggressive investment strategy is less likely
to have over-indexation.
Also evident in the upper panels in Figures 3.5 and 3.6 is that the actual funding ratio
of the ZIP scheme is insensitive to the change of the asset value, a phenomenon also seen
in the consistent implementation. Akin to the case of the consistent implementation, the
actual funding ratio as a function of the asset value depends on the investment strategy
and the policy ladder chosen by the pension fund. Compare Figures 3.5 with Panel B of
Figure 3.1, and compare Figure 3.6 with Panel B of Figure 3.3. One can ﬁnd that the
pattern of the dependence on the investment strategy and on the policy ladder is similar
to the case in the consistent implementation. The intuitive explanation we oﬀered in the
case of the consistent implementation seems also plausible here.
Given the relevance of these various factors, it is possible that the actual funding
ratio of Fund A is greater than that of Fund B, but the zero-indexation proxies of the
two funds indicate the other way around. It implies that the comparison of ﬁnancial
solvency of diﬀerent funds based solely on their zero-indexation proxies can be mislead-62 Valuation and Implementation of Conditional Indexation
ing. Furthermore, even for a single fund, an improved zero-indexation proxy may not
indicate improved ﬁnancial solvency if there are major changes in relevant aspects. The
complicated relation between the zero-indexation proxy and the actual funding ratios im-
plies there does not exist a simple way to “discount” the zero-indexation proxy to learn
about the actual ﬁnancial status of pension funds. Ideally, reliable discounting should
take into account current asset value, investment policy, policy ladder, and demographic
composition of pension funds.
Table 3.1 compares the three funding ratios discussed in this chapter: the consistent
funding ratio, the zero-indexation proxy, and the actual funding ratio of the ZIP scheme.
For a given asset value, the zero-indexation proxy is greater than the consistent funding
ratio, which in turn is greater than the actual funding ratio of the ZIP scheme. So it
is predictable that a change from the implementation based on zero-indexation proxy
to the consistent implementation, ceteris paribus, will improve the ﬁnancial soundness
of pension funds. The reason for the improvement is that after the change of valuation
method, indexation decisions are made based on less favorable (to participants) funding
ratios, resulting in less indexation, and thus less pension liabilities.
3.5 Conclusion
In this chapter, we addressed the market valuation of conditionally indexed pension li-
abilities in two types of implementation. One is the current practice, where a proxy of
funding ratio, typically the zero-indexation proxy, is used for indexation decisions. The
other is to use the market-based and ﬁnancially correct funding ratio for indexation deci-
sions. Given its conformity with the ongoing move to market-based accounting standards,
the latter implementation, known as the consistent implementation here, may be able to
ﬁnd its way into practice; the valuation of conditionally granted pension liability is on
the agenda of the pension regulator in the Netherlands,4 where many pension funds have
adopted conditional indexation.
In this chapter, we developed a backward recursion approach to the liability valuation
in the consistent implementation. Based on the same model, we also considered the
liability valuation in the proxy-based implementation. Numerical examples show that in
both types of implementation, pension funds with conditional indexation ﬁnd a middle
4See “Principles for a ﬁnancial assessment framework: more transparency and clearer information”
by the Dutch central bank, DNB.3.5 Conclusion 63
road between DB and DC to the extent that the ﬁnancial status depends on the asset
value of pension funds. Conditional indexation provides a shield of the ﬁnancial solvency
against the ﬂuctuation of the asset value through introducing a DC element into the
originally DB system. The numerical examples also highlight the impact on the ﬁnancial
status of the investment strategy and the indexation rule that a pension fund adopts.
In the proxy-based implementation, the actual funding ratio, as opposed to the proxy,
needs to be computed and used in assessing the ﬁnancial soundness of pension funds.
Some numerical exercises show that in this respect, the zero-indexation proxy may be
misleading: an increase in the zero-indexation proxy (or equivalently in the asset value)
may hurt the actual funding ratio of a pension fund. The actual funding ratio is directly
related to the distribution of future actual funding ratios, which form the basis of pension
solvency regulation. The existence of such peculiar scenarios is related to the dynamic
inconsistency inherent in this type of implementation. Moreover, the comparison of the
ﬁnancial status among pension funds based solely on the proxy is rendered invalid by
the fact that the relation between the proxy and the actual funding ratio depends on the
investment policy, the indexation rule and the demographics of pension funds.
In the consistent implementation, the cumulative practice of indexation leads to a
computational problem of high dimension if a more realistic model with multiple gener-
ations is adopted. The dimensionality problem is not addressed here, and invites further
research. Other interesting avenues for future research include examining the extent to
which the regulation using the zero-indexation proxy is suboptimal, and conducting an
welfare analysis of the pension contracts resulting from implementing conditional index-


























































Panel A: the actual funding ratio as a function of the zero−indexatio proxy









































Panel B: the Delta of the indexation option
Figure 3.6: The proxy-based implementation for diﬀerent policy ladders In
this ﬁgure, Panel A shows the actual funding ratio at time t as a function of the zero-indexation proxy,
and Panel B shows the ﬁrst-order derivative of the actual liability value with respect to the asset value
(the Delta of the indexation option). The upper threshold of funding ratio Ku is assumed to be 1.15
(the solid line), 1.40 (the dashed line), and 1.60 (the dotted line). The horizontal axes of both panels
are set to correspond to each other.Chapter 4
Portfolio Choices and Consumption
Smoothing under Time-variant
Equity Premia and State
Uncertainty
4.1 Introduction
There has been well documented empirical evidence that the equity premia are time-
varying rather than constant (see, for instance, Poterba and Summers [1988], Fama and
French [1989], and Cochrane [2005]). Expected returns on common stocks have been
found to vary over business cycles, and the general message of the empirical evidence
is that expected returns are lower when business conditions are strong and higher when
business conditions are weak. The implications of time-variation in expected returns are
widely recognized by both academics and investment professionals. Some recent papers,
for instance Kim and Omberg [1996] and Wachter [2002], have studied the implications for
dynamic asset allocation of this deviation from the traditional view of constant expected
returns. In this situation, optimal consumption and investment strategies involve timing
business conditions. Optimal strategies typically require more allocation to stocks when
business conditions are relatively weak.
It has long been recognized that investors do not have complete information about
business conditions or the state of economy. Institutional and individual investors usually
disagree on the assessment of the current business conditions, and economic prospects.
This disagreement is symptomatic of the fact that there is quite some uncertainty sur-
rounding the state of the economy. In the context of time-varying expected returns,
6566 Time-variant Equity Premia and State Uncertainty
state uncertainty leads to uncertainty about expected returns, which an investor must
take into account in choosing the optimal consumption and investment. Extensive work
has been undertaken on the implications of state uncertainty for portfolio analysis. In
a continuous-time setting, Detemple [1986], Dothan and Feldman [1986], and Gennotte
[1986] examine the portfolio problem of an investor who cannot observe the true state of
the economy. An important ﬁnding of these authors is that the investor’s decision prob-
lem in the presence of unobservable state variables may be decomposed into two separate
problems: an inference problem in which the investor estimates the current values of the
state variables, and an investment optimization problem which is solved by treating the
estimated values of the state variable as state variables themselves.
In this chapter, we examine the optimal consumption and asset allocation in a setting
where expected returns on stocks are time-varying, but unobservable. In particular, the
unobservable expected return is assumed to follow a mean-reverting process. The model
can be viewed as an extension of Kim and Omberg [1996] by assuming unobservability of
the expected return. Using the estimation-optimization procedure leads to the solution
of the problem. In the presence of state uncertainty, the investor’s assessment of the
investment opportunity set is imperfect in the sense that the estimation error does not
vanish over time. Moreover, after observing a suﬃciently long history of realized returns
on stocks, the investor can no longer improve upon the estimation error. We refer to the
state where the estimation error remains unchanged over time as the stable phase. We
ﬁnd that in the stable phase, the optimal consumption and asset allocation can be solved
in closed form, which provides insights into the consumption and investment behavior in
the presence of state uncertainty.
This chapter is related to the work by Brennan [1998], who analyzes the dynamic port-
folio problem of an investor who knows the expected return is constant but is uncertain
about its value. The focus of Brennan’s study is on the role of future learning about the
expected return in asset allocation, and his numerical exercise shows state uncertainty
has a signiﬁcant eﬀect on portfolio choice. Our study can be viewed as an extension of
Brennan [1998] in that when the mean-reverting characterization of the expected return
is reduced to a constant by speciﬁc choice of parameter values, our model corresponds
to his constant expected return case. Note that if the expected return is constant, the
estimation error will vanish as the observation interval increases. Thus state uncertainty
does not aﬀect portfolio decisions in the long run. In contrast, when there is time vari-4.2 The investor’s decision problem 67
ation in the expected return, the estimation error always exists and aﬀects investor’s
choice.
In this study, the investor is allowed to derive utility from terminal wealth as well
as intermediate consumption. When this model is applied to provide insights to the
ﬁnancial decisions of collective deﬁned-contribution pension funds, the consumption plan
in the model can be interpreted as the beneﬁt policy of pension funds. Because the
beneﬁt policy of pension funds has been a subject of heated debate in recent years, the
implications of consumption smoothing arising from this study for the beneﬁt policy are
discussed.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. The model and the general
solution method are presented in Section 4.2. Section 4.3 is devoted to the optimal
strategy in the stable phase where the investor can no longer improve upon the estimation
error. In section 5.5, we oﬀer some representative numerical examples and discussion.
Section 5.6 concludes.
4.2 The investor’s decision problem
Consider an investor who is concerned with maximizing the expected utility deﬁned over
lifetime consumption and wealth at the end of a horizon, T. The investor can trade
continuously in a riskless bond and a risky stock. For the riskless bond, the constant
interest rate is denoted by r, so that the price of the bond at time t is described by
dBt = rBtdt. (4.1)
The stock price St is characterized by the following stochastic diﬀerential equation:
dSt
St
=  tdt + σ1dZS,t, (4.2)
where ZS,t is a standard Brownian motion and σ1 is a positive constant.  t is the expected
return of the stock, and assumed to follow an Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process:
d t = θ(¯   −  t)dt + σ2dZ ,t, (4.3)
where Z ,t is another standard Brownian motion jointly normally distributed with ZS,t,
and ¯  , θ, and σ2 are positive constants. This characterization of ﬁnancial markets re-
ﬂects the empirical ﬁnding that equity markets have time-varying risk premia, and it is68 Time-variant Equity Premia and State Uncertainty
adopted by Kim and Omberg [1996] in their investigation of optimal portfolio decisions.
What distinguishes this study from that of Kim and Omberg [1996] is that in this study
we assume the expected return  t to be unobservable to the investor. Whereas all the
parameter values are assumed to be known to the investor, the unobservability assump-
tion of the expected return serves to characterize the incomplete information and state
uncertainty that are often, if not always, confronting investors.
The assumption that all the parameters are known is a stringent one, since gener-
ally investors do not know for sure either the current expected return or the dynamics
governing the evolution of the expected return. For a more realistic model, for instance,
one may also allow for parameter uncertainty.1 However, we opt to simplify by modeling
the incomplete information as an unobservable variable generated by a known process.
This model can be viewed as a generalization of the study by Brennan [1998], because if
θ = σ2 = 0, the model corresponds to the problem studied by him.
In the spirit of Fleming and Rishel [1975], Gennotte [1986], Detemple [1986], and
Dothan and Feldman [1986], the investor’s decision problem in this situation can be
decomposed into two separate problems: an inference problem in which the investor
estimates the current value of the expected return,  t, and an investment problem which
is solved by treating the estimated value of the expected return as the expected return
itself.
First consider the inference problem. Denote the mean and variance of the estimation
of the expected return,  t, by mt and Vt. Assume that at the beginning of the observation
interval, the investor views the distribution of  0 as a Gaussian distribution with mean
m0 and variance V0. Then it follows from Gennotte [1986] and Liptser and Shiryayev
[1978] that
















1 (σ1σ2ρ + Vt)
2 
dt, (4.5)
where ρ is the correlation coeﬃcient between the two Brownian motions, ZS,t and Z ,t.
Equation (4.4) summarizes the investor’s update of the investment opportunity over time.
Intuitively, the investor tends to raise her assessment of the mean when it is below the
known long-term mean of the expected return (¯  −mt > 0), and vice versa. In addition,
1Xia [2001] shows that uncertainty of parameters aﬀects the optimal portfolio choice through dynamic
learning.4.2 The investor’s decision problem 69
the investor updates her assessment by comparing the security return (dSt/St) and her
current assessment of the mean. Assuming σ1σ2ρ + Vt > 0, the investor tends to raise
her assessment whenever the security return is above her current assessment. When
σ1σ2ρ + Vt < 0, the opposite is true. Equation (4.5) shows that the estimation error is a
deterministic function of time.
















Gennotte [1986] shows that Z′
t is an observable Brownian motion, and contains the same
information as that in the path of St. Given the investor’s estimation of the expected
return, and the introduction of Z′




= mtdt + σ1dZ
′
t, (4.7)






Now turn to the second step of the investor’s decision, the investment optimization
problem in which she uses her current estimate of  t to choose the optimal plan of
consumption and asset allocation. Denote the initial wealth at time 0 of the investor by
W0. Her consumption plan is characterized by an consumption-rate process ct, and her
portfolio plan is a process of portfolio weights in the stock xt. The residual, 1 − xt, is
allocated to the riskless bond. From the self-ﬁnancing property of the portfolio strategy,
it follows that the wealth process is given by
dWt = [r + xt(mt − r)]Wtdt − ctdt + xtσ1WtdZ
′
t. (4.9)
Assume that the investor has constant relative risk aversion. Then the optimization
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where γ is the constant rate of relative risk aversion, η denotes the subjective discount
rate, and ψ denotes the importance of bequest to the investor.
Assuming there exists a solution of the dynamic optimization problem (4.10), we can
solve the problem. Thus, the investor’s decision problem with the unobservable expected
return is solved, which is summarized by the following theorem.
Theorem 4.2.1. For the investor facing the consumption and investment problem in
the presence of state uncertainty, the optimal consumption-wealth ratio, c∗
t/W ∗
t , and the
optimal portfolio plan, x∗




































































with the boundary condition
F(mT,T) = ψ
1/γ.
Proof. See Appendix 4.A.
The function F(mt,t) gives the value of the optimal wealth-consumption ratio, as is
illustrated by (4.11). The ﬁrst term in (4.12) is the familiar myopic allocation to stock
(the allocation when γ = 1), and the second term is the stock allocation for intertempo-
ral hedging purposes. It is well known that intertemporal hedging demands arise from
stochastic investment opportunity sets (Merton [1971]). Because the investment oppor-
tunity set in this model is stochastic, and perceived as such by the investor, it is natural
to have an intertemporal hedging term in the optimal allocation.
The investor’s consumption and investment depends on her assessment of the in-
vestment opportunity, mt. Moreover, Equation (4.8) shows that the investor takes into
account the whole history of the risky asset return till now in her assessment of the cur-
rent investment opportunity, for the reason that Z′
t incorporates the same information as4.3 The optimal strategy in the stable phase 71
the path of St does. Therefore, the consumption and investment of the investor depend
on the path of the risky asset return over the observation interval. The path-dependence
of the consumption and investment implies that the investor ﬁrst takes some form of
“average” of the historical returns on the risky asset, and then decides her consumption
and investment on the basis of the average.
4.3 The optimal strategy in the stable phase
In the presence of state uncertainty, the investor’s assessment of the investment oppor-
tunity set is generally imperfect in the sense that the estimation error, Vt, cannot be
ignored even if realized returns are observed continuously over an inﬁnite horizon. In this
case, as the observation interval tends to [0,∞), the variance of the estimator converges
to a constant given by



















We refer to the phase in which the variance of the estimator is equal to this constant by
the stable phase. Once in this phase, the investor will continue to update the estimate of
the expected return from observing realized returns, mt, but she cannot improve upon
the estimation error, Vt. An interesting feature in the stable phase is that the return on
the risky asset is perceived by the investor to be less volatile than if there is no state
uncertainty, as is shown in the following proposition.
Proposition 4.3.1. In the stable phase, the expected return of the risky asset is perceived
to have lower volatility than that of the latent expected return  t, namely,
 
   
 
σ1σ2ρ + ¯ V
σ1
 
   
  ≤ σ2. (4.15)
Proof. From Equation (4.8), it follows that in the stable phase, the estimate of the
expected return is given by









Compared to the stochastic diﬀerential equation (SDE) (4.3) that characterizes the unob-
servable expected return, this SDE is also of Ornstein-Uhlenbeck type with the same drift72 Time-variant Equity Premia and State Uncertainty
term, but a diﬀerent diﬀusion term. Thus, a lower diﬀusion term as presented by (4.15)
means that the perceived expected return, mt, is less volatile than the latent expected






























which obviously holds since |ρ| ≤ 1.
An investigation of the investor’s decision in the stable phase is of interest since it leads
to insights on how an investor with “suﬃcient experience” will consume and invest. From
the perspective of solving the dynamic asset allocation problem with state uncertainty,
the stable phase allows for a closed-form solution when the investor is more risk averse
than log utility (γ > 1). This assumption that γ > 1 is empirically relevant, since many
empirical studies of people’s risk aversion (see e.g. Friend and Blume [1975], Pindyck
[1988], and Szpiro [1986]) and the literature on the equity premium puzzle lend support
to it.







































which can be solved in closed form as follows. First, enlightened by the solutions of
the PDEs in Kim and Omberg [1996] and Wachter [2002], we take the following as the































The three functions, A1, A2, and A3, can be solved by substituting (4.19) back into
(4.18), and then working out the resultant three diﬀerential equations in A1, A2, and A3.
The assumption that γ > 1 is needed to ensure the existence of well behaved solution of4.3 The optimal strategy in the stable phase 73
these diﬀerential equations. The method for solving these equations is standard in the
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1 − e−qτ/2 2
σ1q[2q − (q + b1)(1 − e−qτ)]
,







































Therefore, the optimal strategy of the investor is solved as is presented in the following
lemma.




























t [A1(s − t)mt−r
σ1 + A2(s − t)]eH(mt,s−t)ds
  T









σ1 + A2(T − t)]eH(mt,T−t)
  T
t eH(mt,s−t)ds + ψ1/γeH(mt,T−t)
.
Note that the second and third terms in (4.21) are the allocation for intertempo-
ral hedging purposes. And the third term arises from bequest motives, for this term
disappears if the investor does not derive utility from bequest (ψ = 0).
While (4.20) and (4.21) may ﬁrst appear complicated, they can used to provide in-
sights into the decision of the experienced investor in the presence of state uncertainty.74 Time-variant Equity Premia and State Uncertainty
Proposition 4.3.3. Assume that the investor is more risk averse than log utility (γ > 1),
and that the long-term mean of equity risk premium is positive (¯  −r > 0). Then as long
as the perceived risk premium, mt − r, is positive, the optimal consumption-wealth ratio
is increasing in the perceived expected return mt.
The proof of this proposition is straightforward. Appendix 5.A shows that A1(τ) and
A2(τ) are both positive when γ > 1 and ¯  −r > 0. Then as long as mt−r > 0, the partial
derivative of H(mt,τ) with respect to mt is negative. In this situation, it immediately
follows that the partial derivative of (4.20) with respect to mt is positive. Therefore the
optimal consumption-wealth ratio increases with mt. This result is also intuitive, in that
people tend to consume more when they believe economic perspectives are good.
Proposition 4.3.4. Assume that the investor’s preference and the ﬁnancial market dy-
namics satisfy the following conditions:
1. the investor is more risk averse than log utility (γ > 1);
2. the long-term mean of equity risk premium is positive (¯   − r > 0);
3. κ < 0, or equivalently σ2/σ1 + 2θρ < 0.
Then as long as the perceived risk premium, mt − r, is positive, the optimal investment
policy has the following properties:
1. the intertemporal hedging demand is positive, namely, the allocation to the risky
asset is higher than the corresponding myopic allocation;
2. the optimal allocation increases with the investment horizon.
Conversely, if κ > 0, or equivalently σ2/σ1 +2θρ > 0 while other things being equal, then
the opposite is true. In the special case where κ = 0, or σ2/σ1 + 2θρ = 0, the optimal
investment plan corresponds to the myopic one.
Proof. See Appendix 4.A.
Out of the three conditions in Proposition 4.3.4, the ﬁrst two are straightforward. The
third one, however, is more delicate, and a further exploration is in order. This condition,
which concerns the sign of σ2/σ1+2θρ, determines whether the horizon eﬀect is positive,
negative or absent. The conventional wisdom suggests a positive horizon eﬀect by saying4.3 The optimal strategy in the stable phase 75
that a long-horizon investor should invest more in equity. The reason is that equity is less
risky in long horizons as equity risk premium is time-varying and above-average returns
tend to oﬀset below-average returns. Along this line of reasoning, the condition that
σ2/σ1 + 2θρ < 0 should imply equity’s reduced risk over long horizon, and vice versa.
As is shown in Appendix 4.A, it is indeed this case. Only if σ2/σ1 + 2θρ < 0, the stock
in the perception of the investor is less risky over long horizons as evidenced by the fact
that the stock return’s average variance decreases with horizons. Note that in the case
where σ2/σ1 + 2θρ > 0, the stock is actually perceived more risky when the investor’s
horizon is longer. In this situation, the risk-return proﬁle of the stock gets worse in long
horizons, and it is understandable for the investor to decrease the stock allocation with
the horizon, implying a negative horizon eﬀect.
The conventional wisdom of more equity investment for long-term investors suggests
that ﬁnancial market dynamics satisfying σ2/σ1 + 2θρ < 0 are more likely. For this
condition to hold, it is necessary though not suﬃcient that the correlation between the
stock return and the risk premium is negative (ρ < 0). When this correlation is negative,
the conventional wisdom of positive horizon eﬀect tends to prevail if the expected return
is stable (small σ2 and large θ) and the stock return is volatile (large σ1).
Thanks to the presence of the parameter, ψ, which measures the strength of bequest
motives, this model allows for an analysis on how people’s bequest motives aﬀect their
consumption and investment. From (4.20) and the positiveness of γ, we have the following
proposition.
Proposition 4.3.5. The optimal consumption-wealth ratio is decreasing in the strength
of bequest motives, ψ.
This result is what one would expect: the more you want to leave as bequests, you
should consume less in order to have more to save as bequests.
Proposition 4.3.6. Assume that (i)γ > 1; (ii) ¯  −r > 0; and (iii) σ2/σ1+2θρ < 0. Then
as long as the perceived risk premium, mt−r, is positive, the optimal allocation to the risky
asset increases with the strength of bequest motives, ψ. Conversely, if σ2/σ1 + 2θρ > 0
while other things being equal, then the opposite is true.76 Time-variant Equity Premia and State Uncertainty
The derivative of the optimal stock allocation x∗
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0 eH(mt,s)ds + ψ1/γeH(mt,τ) 2 ,
where τ = T − t. With the three assumptions in the above proposition, it follows from
(4.34) that as long as mt−r > 0, this derivative is positive. And the sign of the derivative
is reversed when ceteris paribus, the sign of σ2/σ1 +2θρ turns from negative to positive.
Note that the eﬀect of bequest motives on the stock allocation has the same pattern
as that of the investment horizon. In other words, the stock allocation increases with
the strength of bequest motives when there is a positive horizon eﬀect, and vice versa.
An intuitive explanation goes as follows. Analogous to the notion of duration in ﬁxed
income, an investor with a strong bequest motive should have a longer “eﬀective horizon”
than an investor who has the same characteristics but derives little utility from bequests
as the former distributes more wealth on the ﬁxed horizon date. Thus an increase in
bequest motives, in eﬀect, prolongs the horizon, which explains the close link between
the strength of bequest motives, ψ, and the investment horizon.
4.4 Calibration and discussion
In this section, we present some representative numerical illustrations and discussions.
The parameter values underlying the calibration exercises are drawn from Barberis [2000]
and Wachter [2002], and summarized in Table 4.1.
Parameter Description Notation Parameter Values
Subjective discount rate η 0.0624
Riskless rate r 0.0168
Volatility of stock price σ1 0.1510
Volatility of expected return σ2 0.0343
Unconditional mean of expected return ¯   0.0576
Mean-reverting parameter of expected return θ 0.2712
Correlation coeﬃcient ρ −0.9351
Table 4.1: The parameter values used in the numerical analysis The parameter
values are calculated based on Barberis [2000] and Wachter [2002]. All parameters are in annual units.
Figure 4.1 shows how the estimation error Vt changes with the length of observation
interval for diﬀerent values of the initial estimation error V0. Regardless of the various4.4 Calibration and discussion 77















The estimation error approaches its asymptotic value
V
0 = 5 × Asymp. Variance
V
0 = 2 × Asymp. Variance
V
0 = 1.5 × Asymp. Variance
V
0 = 0.5 × Asymp. Variance
V
0 = 0 × Asymp. Variance
Figure 4.1: The change of estimation error, Vt, over the observation interval
This ﬁgure shows how estimation error Vt changes with the observation interval for diﬀerent values of
the initial estimation error V0: V0 = a¯ V , where a = {5,2,1.5,0.5,0}. The variance is in annual units,
and the parameter values are given in Table 4.1.
values of V0 considered here, it takes about 30 years for the estimation error to come
close to its asymptotic value. Thus in this numerical setting, the investor is able to reach
the stable phase with a fairly short history of the risky asset returns. For this reason, we
shall devote the numerical analysis to the stable phase.
To gain some insight on the magnitude of the diﬀerence between the estimated and
latent expected returns discussed in Proposition 4.3.1, we compare these two returns
in this numerical setting. From (4.30) it follows that the estimated expected return








parameters characterizing the dynamics of the latent expected return in (4.3) are assumed








. Figure 4.2 shows that in this numerical setting, the estimated
expected return is appreciably less volatile than the latent expected return. For instance,
the probability of negative latent risk premium is about 0.19 while it is 0.12 for the
estimated risk premium. The investor is aware of the diﬀerence between the unconditional78 Time-variant Equity Premia and State Uncertainty






















estimated in stable phase
Figure 4.2: The asymptotic distributions of the unobservable risk premium and
the estimated risk premium in the stable phase This ﬁgure shows the asymptotic
distributions of the unobservable risk premium and the estimated risk premium in the stable phase. The
risk premia are in annual rates, and the parameter values are given in Table 4.1.
distributions of the estimated and latent expected returns though, she, in the face of state
uncertainty, seems to opt to be prudent in estimation.
4.4.1 Optimal investment and consumption policy
Figure 4.3 shows the optimal consumption and investment plan for a range of estimated
values of expected return. The value range corresponds to the 95% conﬁdence interval
with respect to the asymptotic distribution of mt. Observe ﬁrst that the more risk
tolerant the investor is (lower γ), the more responsive the consumption and investment
are to the variation of the estimated return. Secondly, consistent with Proposition 4.3.3,
the consumption is increasing with the estimated return. Likewise, a higher estimated
return leads the investor to allocate more to the stock.
Recall that the investor forms the estimate of the expected return on the basis of
the realized returns on the stock, and the current estimate depends on the entire history




























































































Figure 4.3: How the optimal consumption and investment respond to the esti-
mated expected return This ﬁgure shows how the optimal consumption-wealth ratio (Panel A)
and allocation to the risky asset (Panel B) change with the estimated expected return for diﬀerent rates
of relative risk aversion (γ = {2,5,10,50}). It is assumed that the horizon T is 20 years, and ψ = 1.
Other parameter values are given in Table 4.1.
the investor’s current estimate. It’s intuitively clear that other things being equal, a
big shock to the stock price will result in a relatively more signiﬁcant adjustment of the
estimate. Moreover, given the size of the shock, the current estimate also depends on
how long ago the shock happened, or the “age” of the shock. As is illustrated by Figure
4.4, the impact of the shock on the current estimate declines exponentially with its age.
The impact on the estimate in this ﬁgure is computed as follows. First we compute the
estimated expected for a baseline path of the realized returns dSt/St. Then introduce a
shock of some size to a certain time point of this path. We vary the time of the shock, get
the corresponding new estimate, and compute the diﬀerence between the new estimate
and the baseline estimate, which measures the impact of the stock price shock of varying80 Time-variant Equity Premia and State Uncertainty
ages.



























































Figure 4.4: How the age of the shock to the stock price aﬀects the estimate of
the expected return This ﬁgure shows how the age of the shock to the stock price aﬀects the
estimated of expected return. The size of the shock is assumed to be −1.2816 realization of ZS,t+1−ZS,t
(recall that 1.2816 is the 90 percentile of a standard normal variable), and the age of the shock varies
from 1 month to 50 years. The impact on the estimated expected return is represented in yearly units.
Other relevant parameter values are given in Table 4.1.
The exponential relationship between the age of the shock and the impact of the
shock on the estimate illustrated in Figure 4.4 can also be established analytically. From
Equation (4.4) and Vt = ¯ V in the stable phase, it follows that
mt = ¯   + e








− ¯  du
 
.
It is clear from the above equation that the impact of the stock price shock, dSu/Su, on
the estimate declines with the age of the shock, t − u.
In this numerical exercise, we introduce a negative shock to the stock price, which
leads the investor to increase the estimate of expected return for the reason that κ is
negative in this setting (cf. (4.6) and (4.30)). As Figure 4.3 shows, an increase in the
estimated expected return will typically result in higher consumption-wealth ratio and
more allocation to the risky asset. Integrating the ﬁndings from Figure 4.4 and 4.3, we
can expect that the age of the stock price shock also has an impact on the investor’s con-
sumption and investment. To illustrate the magnitude of this impact, Figure 4.5 presents
the percentage changes in the consumption-wealth ratio and the stock weight caused by
the shock of varying ages. Observe that a recent price shock has a appreciable impact4.4 Calibration and discussion 81
on the investor’s consumption and investment, and the impact is decreasing noticeably
with the age of the shock.


















































Panel A:  Impact on consumption wealth ratio

















































Figure 4.5: How the age of the shock to the stock price aﬀects the optimal
consumption and investment This ﬁgure is based on a baseline path of constant stock
returns equal to ¯ µ. The size of the shock is assumed to be −1.2816 realization of ZS,t+1 − ZS,t (recall
that 1.2816 is the 90 percentile of a standard normal variable), and the age of the shock varies from
1 month to 50 years. The impact on the consumption and investment is expressed as the percentage
changes in consumption-wealth ratio and stock weight with respect to their baseline values. It is assumed
that the horizon is 20 years and ψ = 1. Other relevant parameter values are given in Table 4.1.
Turn to the investor’s stock allocation for intertemporal hedging purposes. We as-
sume that the current estimated expected return is equal to the long-term mean ¯  . As
Proposition 4.3.4 predicts, with a negative value of σ2/σ1 + 2ρθ the hedging allocation
is positive and increasing in the horizon (Figure 4.6). This ﬁgure also shows that the
hedging allocation is not monotonic in the rate of relative risk aversion.
4.4.2 Implications for the beneﬁt policy of pension funds
Apart from portfolio management, a collective deﬁned-contribution (CDC) pension fund
also has the task of deciding the beneﬁt policy, especially the amount of beneﬁt paid out in
a certain situation. When a CDC fund is modeled in the framework of Merton’s problem
like the one discussed in this chapter, the consumption policy in Merton’s problem can
be interpreted as the beneﬁt policy of the pension fund. In the following, we consider the


































Figure 4.6: The intertemporal hedging allocation as a function of horizon and
risk aversion This ﬁgure shows how the intertemporal hedging allocation changes with the rate of
relative risk aversion γ and the investment horizon T. It is assumed that the current estimated expected
return equals the long-term mean ¯ µ, and ψ = 1. Other relevant parameter values are given in Table 4.1.
In this economy with time-varying expected return and state uncertainty, the con-




=  c(mt)dt + σc(mt)dZ
′
t









where  c( ) and σc( ) are functions to be speciﬁed on the basis of the consumption and
investment policy. Observe that  c( ) is the trend of the consumption, whereas σc( )
represents how the consumption/beneﬁt responds to stock price shocks.
First consider the dynamics of the pension beneﬁt resulting from the optimal policy
in the stable phase as given in Lemma 4.3.2. Figure 4.7 shows how the pension bene-
ﬁt/consumption responds to stock price shocks. Observe ﬁrst that the diﬀusion term of
2In general the function µc( ) also depends on time t. Given the very long horizon typically faced by
pension funds, however, we simplify the analysis by assuming that the function µc( ) depends only on
the state variable mt.4.4 Calibration and discussion 83
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Figure 4.7: How the pension beneﬁt/consumption responds to stock price
shocks This ﬁgure shows the diﬀusion term σc(mt) resulting from diﬀerent consumption and in-
vestment policies. The four light lines are based on the optimal policy given in Lemma 4.3.2 assuming
diﬀerent values of risk aversion (γ ∈ {2,5,10,50}). The bold solid line assumes that the preference is of
Epstein-Zin type with relative risk aversion equal to 5, and the elasticity of intertemporal substitution
equal to 1/10, that the investment strategy is a constant proportion strategy with stock weight equal to
50%, and that the agent chooses the optimal consumption plan to maximize the utility. It is assumed
that ψ = 1. Other relevant parameter values are given in Table 4.1.
the SDE, σc(mt), is increasing in the estimated expected return mt regardless of the rates
of risk aversion considered here, and that σc(mt) is positive when the estimated expected
return is large, and negative when the estimated expected return is low. Secondly, the
absolute value of σc(mt) is increasing with the rate of risk aversion, reﬂecting that less
risk averse investors have relatively more volatile consumption stream.
The ﬁgure seems to suggest a linear relationship between mt and σc(mt), which in
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Figure 4.8: The trend of pension beneﬁt This ﬁgure shows the drift term µt(mt) resulting
from diﬀerent consumption and investment policy. The four light lines are based on the optimal policy
given in Lemma 4.3.2 assuming diﬀerent rates of risk aversion (γ ∈ {2,5,10,50}). The bold solid line
assumes that the preference is of Epstein-Zin type with relative risk aversion equal to 5, and the elasticity
of intertemporal substitution equal to 1/10, that the investment strategy is a constant proportion strategy
with stock weight equal to 50%, and that the agent chooses the optimal consumption plan to maximize
the utility. It is assumed that ψ = 1. Other relevant parameter values are given in Table 4.1.








Therefore, how the pension beneﬁt/consumption responds to stock price shocks is decided
by the rate of risk aversion and the perceived market price of risk, which is closely related
to the myopic allocation to the stock.
Figure 4.8 shows the trend of the pension beneﬁt arising from the optimal consumption
and investment strategy in the stable phase. Generally, the relationship between the
estimated expected return mt and the drift term  c(mt) exhibits a “U” shape. The trend
of the pension beneﬁt is the lowest when the estimated expected return is around the
riskless interest rate. The trend increases when the estimated expected either increases
to signiﬁcantly positive region or drops to the negative region. It is intuitively plausible4.4 Calibration and discussion 85
for the trend of the pension beneﬁt to increase when the estimated expected return drops
in the negative region, for the reason that the agent is allowed to short the stock to take
advantage of negative expected return.
Combining the ﬁndings from Figure 4.7 and 4.8, we can see that whenever the trend
of the pension beneﬁt is low, the beneﬁt is relatively less responsive to stock price shocks,
and thus less volatile. Conversely, when the trend is high, the beneﬁt is relatively more
responsive and then more risky. This pattern reﬂects that the agent trades oﬀ the amount
and riskiness of the consumption stream.
4.4.3 Fixed-mix policies
Of course, the investment strategies that have been developed above depend rather
strongly on model assumptions. Given the uncertainty that surrounds such assump-
tions, pension funds may consider it wise not to try to time the market and may prefer
to hold on to a policy in which for instance a ﬁxed percentage of wealth is invested in
risky assets. When the investment policy is ﬁxed in this way, there is still the consump-
tion policy to be determined. Fund policy should aim for smooth consumption patterns;
however, under a ﬁxed-mix policy which involves a substantial investment in risky assets,
gradual adjustment to varying market circumstances is necessary. Taking a long-horizon
perspective, we may assume that consumption policy does not depend on calendar time.
More speciﬁcally, suppose that consumption at time t is given by
ct = φ(mt)Wt (4.25)
where φ( ) is a diﬀerentiable policy function. It is then readily veriﬁed that, under the











where x denotes the fraction of wealth invested in risky assets. Therefore the relative









Typically, both x and φ′(m) are positive; a reduction of volatility will then occur if κ is
negative and not too large in absolute value.86 Time-variant Equity Premia and State Uncertainty
To ﬁnd speciﬁc values, a numerical optimization was carried out using Epstein-Zin














with relative risk aversion parameter γ = 5, elasticity of intertemporal substitution ψ =
0.05, and time preference parameter η = 0.06; the length of the horizon is taken long
enough so that convergence to stationary policies takes place. The optimal policy depends
on the fraction of wealth held in risky assets. It appears that in each case the optimal
consumption/wealth ratio is close to being linear in the business cycle variable mt, so
that we consider policy functions of the form
φ(mt) = α + β(m − ¯  )/σ1. (4.27)
For the case in which 50% of wealth is held in risky assets, we ﬁnd α ≈ 0.035 and
β ≈ 0.0075. Under a more conservative asset mix, with 20% of wealth held in risky assets,
we obtain α ≈ 0.025 and β ≈ 0.0025. Figure 4.9 shows the results of simulations with
these policies. It is seen that the 50/50 asset mix leads to a larger spread of consumption,
but that it improves in many cases on consumption under the 20/80 asset mix. On the
basis of (4.26), it is found that in both cases the relative volatility of consumption is
about half of what it would be if the consumption-wealth ratio would be constant.




















































Figure 4.9: Consumption The ﬁgures show the average behavior in time of consumption under
the rule (4.27), as well as 5% and 95% quantiles.
The response to stock price shocks and the trend of the consumption are shown
in Figures 4.7 and 4.8. Slightly increasing with the estimated expected return, the term
σc(mt) is relatively invariable in diﬀerent states of the economy (Figure 4.7). An intuitive4.5 Conclusions and future work 87
explanation is that the exposure to risk is stable over diﬀerent states of the economy due
to the constant-proportion investment strategy. Observe that in most cases, the absolute
value of σc(mt) assuming a constant proportion strategy is lower than that arising from
the strategy given in Lemma 4.3.2.
4.5 Conclusions and future work
We have analyzed the optimal consumption and investment problem in a setting with
time-varying equity premium and state uncertainty, two typical situations faced by in-
vestors. This study allows us to investigate their combined implications for consumption
and investment. In the spirit of previous work on state uncertainty, the dynamic opti-
mization problem has been addressed in two separate steps: estimation and optimization.
The optimal consumption and investment plans have been derived; in particular, the so-
lution can be expressed in closed form in the phase where the investor has a suﬃciently
long history of the stock price that she can no longer improve upon the estimation error.
The closed-form solution provides insights into the consumption and portfolio choice.
For instance, the estimated equity premium is perceived to be less volatile than the
unobservable equity premium. The optimal stock allocation may increase, decrease or not
vary with the horizon, dependent on the parameter values of the model. From the closed-
form solution, it also follows that the optimal consumption-wealth ratio is increasing
with the estimated expected return as long as the estimated risk premium is positive.
We examine how bequest motives aﬀect the optimal consumption and investment. The
consumption is decreasing in the strength of bequest motives. The dependence of stock
allocation on bequest motives has the same pattern as the horizon eﬀect.
In the numerical exercise, the investor times the market aggressively in the consump-
tion and investment, and the optimal stock allocation increases with the horizon. We
also discuss the implications of this study for the beneﬁt policy of pension funds, and
ﬁnd that the beneﬁt should be relatively stable over time when a constant-proportion
investment strategy is employed and the elasticity of intertemporal substitution is low.
This study is only an initial attempt to assess the ﬁnancial importance of state uncer-
tainty and time-variant equity premia. While we have considered the uncertainty of the
state of the economy through the assumption of unobservability of the expected return,
we have assumed that the investor knows everything else for sure, including the dynamics88 Time-variant Equity Premia and State Uncertainty
of the expected return and all parameters. A more realistic model should incorporate
parameter uncertainty. In contrast to studies assuming no state uncertainty, this study
examines the case of partial observability. In this study, the degree of state uncertainty is
kept ﬁxed, but in practice it may be time-varying. A challenging future task is to model
the time-variation in the degree of state uncertainty, and investigate its implications for
consumption and portfolio decisions.
4.A Appendix
Proof of Theorem 4.2.1
We opt to solve the problem through dynamic programming. The indirect utility function
























































1−γ , where the subscripts of J denote
the obvious partial derivatives.











Similarly, it follows from the ﬁrst-order condition with respect to xt that the optimal




















γ = (1 − γ)J(1,mt,t).
From the terminal condition J(WT,mT,T) = ψ W 1−γ
1−γ , it follows that
F(mT,T) = ψ
1/γ
From this guessed form of the indirect utility function, J, and its relevant derivatives,
it follows that the optimal consumption-wealth ratio and the optimal portfolio plan are
given by (4.11) and (4.12). Finally, inserting the relevant derivatives and the candidate
optimal strategy into the HJB equation (4.28) yields the PDE (4.13).
The explicit solution of Vt and its value in the stable phase
The ODE characterizing Vt (4.5) is of Riccati type, and can be rewritten as
dVt =
 
























a0 + a1Vx + a2V 2
x
dVx = t
Generally, the integral depends on the sign of the determinant 4a0a2 − a2
1. In this case,






p + a1 + 2a2Vt
p − a1 − 2a2Vt
− ln
p + a1 + 2a2V0
p − a1 − 2a2V0




1 − 4a0a2. Therefore,
Vt =
e−pt(p + a1 + 2a2V0)(p − a1) − (p − a1 − 2a2V0)(p + a1)
2a2(p − a1 − 2a2V0) + 2a2(p + a1 + 2a2V0)e−pt . (4.29)
The value of ¯ V as given by (4.14) follows immediately from its deﬁnition.
Proof of Proposition 4.3.1
From Equation (4.8), it follows that in the stable phase, the estimate of the expected
return is given by
dmt = θ(¯   − mt)dt +





Compared to the stochastic diﬀerential equation (SDE) (4.3) that characterizes the unob-
servable expected return, this SDE is also of Ornstein-Uhlenbeck type with the same drift
term, but a diﬀerent diﬀusion term. Thus, a lower diﬀusion term as presented by (4.15)
means that the perceived expected return, mt, is less volatile than the latent expected
return,  t. After substituting the value of ¯ V given by (4.14) into (4.15), the inequality is




















which obviously holds since ρ ≤ 1.
Properties of A1(τ) and A2(τ)
This appendix establishes some properties of A1(τ) and A2(τ) under the condition that
(i) γ > 1, and (ii) ¯   − r > 0. First deﬁne





It follows from γ > 1 that q > |b1|. Thus, B(τ) > 0. Then it follows immediately that
A1(τ) > 0.
With the condition that ¯   − r > 0, one can see that
A2(τ) > 0.
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Proof of Proposition 4.3.4
First note that the sign of σ1σ2ρ + ¯ V is the same as that of σ2/σ1 + 2θρ, because















Then it follows from the condition that σ2/σ1 + 2θρ < 0 that
σ1σ2ρ + ¯ V < 0. (4.32)
Assuming σ2/σ1+2θρ < 0, the hedging term as presented by the second and third term in
(4.21) is positive as long as mt−r is positive, which proves Property 1 in the proposition.
The proof of Property 2 is more involved. First consider the case where ψ = 0. In
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Then the derivative of
  T
t Ai(s − t)eH(mt,s−t)ds
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t eH(mt,s−t)ds
, for i = 1,2
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 2 (4.33)






, i = 1,2. (4.34)
Then it follows that the derivative (4.33) is positive, and hence Property 2 expressing a
positive horizon eﬀect. In the general case where ψ  = 0, Property 2 can be proved in a
similar (but more tedious) way.
Finally, if σ2/σ1 + 2θρ > 0, then the argument for these two properties assuming
σ2/σ1+2θρ < 0 is reversed. Therefore, the opposite is true assuming σ2/σ1+2θρ > 0.92 Time-variant Equity Premia and State Uncertainty
The riskiness of the stock over long horizons: implications of the
sign of σ1/σ2 + 2θρ






























where ¯ σm =
σ1σ2ρ+¯ V
σ1 . Denote the variance of lnSt and mt at time t by Vs(t) and Vm(t),















with the boundary condition that Vm(0) = Vms(0) = Vs(0) = 0. We can solve the system















To characterize how the riskiness of the stock changes with the investment horizons,


















































where the second equality follows from (4.37). Appendix 4.A shows that ¯ σm < 0 if and
























(τ) < 0.4.A Appendix 93
Therefore, in the case where σ2/σ1 + 2θρ < 0, the average variance of the stock return
is decreasing in the horizon, implying that the stock is less risky over long horizons.
Similarly, we can show the converse case in which with σ2/σ1 + 2θρ > 0, the riskiness of
the stock increases with the horizon.Chapter 5
Commodities in Dynamic Asset
Allocation: Implications of Mean
Reverting Commodity Prices
5.1 Introduction
Commodities have been emerging as an increasingly important class of assets for institu-
tional and individual investors in recent years. Systematic investigation of commodities
as an investable asset class goes back at least some 30 years ago [Greer, 1978, Bodie
and Rosansky, 1980]. However, the growth of commodity markets to a major alternative
investment vehicle is a more recent development. Around 2007, the size of the global
commodities derivatives market is estimated to be about 750 billion US dollars [Till
and Eagleeye, 2007]. As the markets have grown, more investors have been attracted
to commodities. Increased exposure to commodities has been acquired by institutional
investors, with pension funds as a notable example, and to a less extent by individual
investors as well (see e.g. Mongars and Marchal-Dombrat [2006] and Doyle et al. [2007]).
In the literature of commodity investment, it remains an open question whether and
how to include commodities in mainstream portfolios. Studies on commodity investment
have generally been based on the performance of investment in commodity futures. The
reason is that investment in commodities is mostly by means of derivative products,
especially commodity futures, while spot transactions of commodities play little role
in commodity investment. Most existing studies on commodity investment apply the
one-period mean-variance optimization framework of Markowitz [1952]. In the static
mean-variance framework, the key issues investigated by these studies have been whether
investment in commodities futures yields a positive risk premium, how such investment
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covaries with bonds and stocks, and how it hedges against inﬂation (see e.g. Erb and
Harvey [2006], Gordon and Rouwenhorst [2006], Kat and Oomen [2007] and references
therein). In this literature, the most controversial issue has presumably been whether or
not commodity investment oﬀers a positive risk premium, and if it does, what drives the
risk premium. The absence of an appreciably positive risk premium does not necessarily
make mean-variance investors refrain from allocating to an asset class, but it will surely
make it less attractive or of little practical relevance in most studies. As such, the
ongoing debate over the risk premium of commodity futures investment has left it an
open question whether or not commodities are an appealing asset class.
Empirical evidence has documented that risk premia in commodity futures markets
are timing-varying and predictable. For example, Bessembinder and Chan [1992] show
that prices in commodity futures markets can be forecast on the basis of instrumental
variables known to possess forecasting power in equity and bond markets. Some studies
have found that risk premia of commodity investment vary in diﬀerent states, like the
phase of the business cycle, the stance of monetary policy, market sentiment, and the
history of investment returns (see, for example, Jensen et al. [2000, 2002], Wang and Yu
[2004], Erb and Harvey [2006], Miﬀre and Rallis [2007], Nijman and Swinkels [2007], and
Vrugt et al. [2007]).
Similarly, time-variation and predictability of asset returns have been well documented
in the asset classes of stocks and bonds. What are the implications of time-variation and
predictability of asset returns for portfolio choice? For the mainstream asset classes,
their implications for portfolio choice have been explored in depth, for example, Kim and
Omberg [1996] and Wachter [2002] in the case of stocks. In the case of commodities, how-
ever, much less research eﬀorts have been devoted to the implications of time-varying and
predictable commodity returns for portfolio decision making. In view of this, this chapter
presents a study of the asset class of commodities in an intertemporal framework, with an
explicit focus on the time-varying and predictable returns in commodity markets. In the
literature of commodity investment, the closest to this study is presumably Hoevenaars
et al. [2008], who address the optimal portfolio policy in the context where expected re-
turn of alternative assets, including commodity returns, are time-varying and predictable.
For technical reasons, however, Hoevenaars et al. [2008] consider only constant-proportion
portfolio strategies, and hence abstract from market timing that in principle will arise
from return predictability. This study aims to further the understanding of commodity5.1 Introduction 97
investment, especially in exploiting commodity return predictability by market timing.
This chapter investigates the asset class of commodities in the dynamic optimization
framework that was introduced into ﬁnance by Merton [1969]. The so-called Merton’s
problem has been analyzed and extended in various contexts, reﬂecting diﬀerent at-
tributes of people’s preferences and of ﬁnancial markets (see, for example, Chapter 9 of
Duﬃe [2001] for a textbook treatment). The literature of dynamic asset allocation, how-
ever, has focused predominantly on such traditional asset classes as stocks and bonds.
Owing to the growing importance of commodities, it is pertinent to ask, in this estab-
lished framework, how investors should optimally make their portfolio and consumption
decisions when commodities are available in addition to stocks and bonds.
To this end, I introduce into the classical Black-Scholes economy a commodity market.
Consistent with the fact that commodity futures are the major commodity investment
vehicle, the commodity market is modeled as a futures market. With the addition of
the commodity market, the Black-Scholes economy consisting of a riskless bond and a
risky stock is augmented to an economy equipped with three asset classes. This three-
asset economy, referred to as the “Bond-Stock-Commodity economy” in the following,
enables one to capture the richer investment opportunities stemming from the presence
of commodities.
The commodity futures market is characterized by a generalized version of the single-
factor model in Schwartz [1997]. Following Schwartz [1997], the non-tradable spot com-
modity price follows a mean-reverting process. Rather than assuming a constant risk
premium in the futures market as in Schwartz [1997], I generalize his model by assuming
that the risk premium is dependent on the spot commodity price. This generalization
can be justiﬁed by three reasons. First, as mentioned above, empirical evidence has
shown that risk premia in commodity markets are time-varying, and can be predicted by
instrumental variables characteristic of the business cycle. Second, empirical studies, for
example Fama and French [1988], have identiﬁed a strong business cycle component in
the variation of spot commodity prices. It suggests that spot commodity prices might
have forecast power for risk premia in commodity futures markets. Last but not least, the
estimation results of this extended model presented in this chapter has provided strong
evidence that the eﬀect of the spot price on the risk premium is signiﬁcant.
In this simple characterization of the asset class of commodities, the risk premium
in the commodity market is predicted by the mean-reverting spot commodity price. As98 Commodities in Dynamic Asset Allocation
is well known, mean reversion is an important property of commodity prices, and mean
reversion of prices has become a prevailing assumption in the literature related to the
stochastic behavior of commodity prices, for instance, Gabillon [1995], Schwartz [1997],
Geman [2005], to name but a few. Moreover, empirical studies of commodity prices have
found evidence of mean reversion to various degrees (for example Bessembinder et al.
[1995], Pindyck [2001], and Andersson [2007]).
This study, by relating commodity market returns to spot commodity prices, under-
scores the implications of the mean-reverting nature of the commodity price for commod-
ity investment and portfolio decisions.
The dynamic framework adopted here makes this study distinct from ones that use
a static perspective. In the static one-period paradigm, people are assumed to make a
one-oﬀ investment decision at the beginning of the period in order to maximize their
utility over the investment outcome at the end of the period. In comparison, the dynamic
framework built on an intertemporal setting allows people to make intermediate rebal-
ancing. Undoubtedly the dynamic framework oﬀers a richer structure than the static one
does, and arguably it is closer to ﬁnancial decision-making in practice. It has long been
known that unless (i) investors have logarithmic utility, or (ii) the ﬁnancial market oﬀers
a constant investment opportunity set in the sense that both the riskfree rate and the
market price of risk are constant, the optimal ﬁnancial policy derived from the dynamic
framework is diﬀerent from the so-called “myopic” policy based solely on one-period
analysis. As will be shown, the time variation and predictability of expected returns
in commodity markets, once investigated in the framework of dynamic asset allocation,
has profound implications for commodity investment and portfolio decisions, which the
static mean-variance analysis is unable to accommodate. Therefore, this study, by virtue
of a richer framework, will shed new light on the debate on commodity investment, and
enable us to expound on some contentious issues arising from static analysis in light of
the ﬁndings from a dynamic perspective.
This study contributes to the discussion of commodity investment by taking a novel
route to approach the issue. Diﬀerent from focusing on indices of commodity futures in
extant literature, I model commodities into the economy as commodity futures underlying
those indices. And this approach may have an advantage in comparison with that based
on commodity futures indices. It has been recognized that commodity futures indices
embed trading strategies of commodity futures (Gordon and Rouwenhorst [2005], Erb5.1 Introduction 99
and Harvey [2006]). Owing to diﬀering ways of composition, weighting and rebalancing,
diﬀerent commodity indices imply diﬀerent trading strategies, and hence may well give
divergent pictures of commodity investment returns, even in a common time period.
In addition to bringing an element of arbitrariness because of varying ways of index
building, the application of indices may blur some important characteristics of commodity
investment, like the implications of mean reversion in commodity prices. In contrast, this
study directly speciﬁes the underlying commodity futures as such, in the hope of achieving
a sharp focus on implications of this property.
I shall consider the optimal ﬁnancial strategy for an investor in two classical cases.
In the ﬁrst, the investor is concerned with maximizing the expected utility over wealth
on some ﬁxed horizon date. The second case I consider is that of an investor who de-
rives utilities over life-time consumption. Of these two cases, the ﬁrst, terminal wealth
case only involves portfolio decisions, and is conceptually easier. The intermediate con-
sumption case, being slightly more complicated, involves both portfolio and consumption
decisions. In both cases, the investor is assumed to have constant relative risk aversion,
and to be more risk averse than a logarithmic investor.
By the speciﬁcation of the commodity futures market in this chapter, the risk pre-
mium of commodity investment turns out to follow an Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process. This
property allows us to approach the dynamic optimization problem in a route similar to
that developed by Kim and Omberg [1996] and Wachter [2002], who address the dynamic
optimization problem in the context of predictable equity premia. Thanks to the simple
structure of the model, the optimal policy and the utility cost of excluding the commodity
are solved in closed form. The optimal policy dictates that allocation to commodities is
made both for myopic purposes and for intertemporal purposes, whereas stock allocation
is made solely out of myopic considerations. The optimal ﬁnancial strategy involves tim-
ing on the spot commodity price, and thus puts forward a theoretical case for the tactical
timing strategies studied in some empirical investigations.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. I present the basic model of the
Bond-Stock-Commodity economy in the next section. Section 5.3 and 5.4 are devoted to
the optimal strategy in the terminal wealth case and in the intermediate consumption
case, respectively. In section 5.5, I estimate the model of commodity futures, and oﬀer
some representative numerical examples and discussion. Section 5.6 concludes.100 Commodities in Dynamic Asset Allocation
5.2 The economy
In the Bond-Stock-Commodity economy, people can invest in three asset classes: bonds,
stocks, and commodities. I opt to characterize the traditional asset classes of bonds and
stocks by the standard Black and Scholes [1973] model in order to isolate the eﬀect of the
introduction of commodities, although it is possible to follow other formulations which
were developed in recent years to reﬂect stochastic interest rates, and the documented
predictability of stock returns.
For the riskless bond, the constant interest rate is denoted by r. The stock price St
follows a geometric Brownian motion
dSt =  1Stdt + σ1StdZ1,t, (5.1)
where  1 and σ1 are positive constants, and Z1,t is a standard Wiener process.
Following Schwartz [1997], the spot commodity price Mt is speciﬁed by the following
single-factor model with mean-reverting property:
dMt = θ( 2 − lnMt)Mtdt + σ2MtdZM,t, (5.2)
where θ,  2, and σ2 are positive constants, and ZM,t is another standard Wiener process









dt + σ2dZM,t. (5.3)
As in Schwartz [1997], the spot commodity price is assumed to be non-tradable. Assuming
the market price of risk associated with the Wiener process driving the spot commodity
price, ZM,t, is given by
λM,t = α + βmt. (5.4)
This assumption is motivated by two empirical ﬁndings: (i) expected returns in com-
modity markets are time-varying and can be predicted by some instrumental variables
characteristic of the business cycle; and (ii) there is a strong business cycle component in
the variation of spot commodity prices. Note that this model is reduced to the one-factor
model of Schwartz [1997] when β = 0.
Then under the risk-neutral measure
dmt =
 
   2 −   θmt
 
dt + σ2d  ZM,t,5.2 The economy 101
where
  θ := θ + σ2β,    2 := θ 2 − σ2α − σ
2
2/2,
and   ZM,t is a standard Wiener process under the risk-neutral measure. From the above
equation, the distribution of mT conditional on mt (t < T) under the risk-neutral measure
is normal with mean and variance:
E
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t [mT] = e
















From the martingale property of futures prices under the risk-neutral measure, it follows
that the futures price of the commodity with maturity T at time t is
Ft(T) = E
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To facilitate the solution of Merton’s problem, I characterize the asset class of com-
modities by the self-ﬁnancing portfolio Mt:
dMt = Mt (r + σ2λM,t)dt + Mtσ2dZM,t. (5.6)
This portfolio is formed by a portfolio strategy of the riskless bond and the commodity
futures as follows. Hold a long position in the commodity futures, and the futures holding
is constantly rolled over to keep the time-to-maturity of futures contracts constant, say
equal to ℓ where ℓ is a positive constant. Moreover, the futures holding is such that
the notional value of the futures contract (the number of futures contracts times the
futures price) at time t is equal to Mte
  θℓ. Because futures contracts have zero value, the
entire portfolio value Mt is invested in the riskless bond. For more detail of the portfolio
strategy of Mt, see Appendix 5.A.
As such, the speciﬁcation of the Bond-Stock-Commodity market has been completed.
To ease the solution to Merton’s problem, however, I reformulate this model by convert-
ing the two possibly correlated driving Wiener processes to a standard two-dimensional
Wiener process (i. e. its two components are independent). Denoting the correlation co-
eﬃcient between Z1,t and ZM,t by ρ where |ρ| < 1, the price dynamics of the two classes102 Commodities in Dynamic Asset Allocation
of risky assets given by (5.1) and (5.6) can be rewritten as











where ¯ ρ :=
 
1 − ρ2, and Zt :=
 
Z1,t Z2,t
 ⊤ is a standard two-dimensional Wiener














Given the speciﬁcation of the ﬁnancial market as in (5.7) and the constant interest
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That is to say, the market price of risk with respect to Z1,t is constant, whereas that
with respect to Z2,t is stochastic and dependent on the commodity price. As such, the
investment opportunity set is stochastic in the Bond-Stock-Commodity economy, and the
optimal strategy should be diﬀerent from the myopic one unless the utility function of
the investor is logarithmic. Moreover, being a linear transform of mt, λ2,t also follows an
Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process:
dλ2,t = θ


























For a market to exclude arbitrage, it suﬃces that the Novikov condition holds (see,














1In this chapter, boldface notation is used to denote vectors and matrices.5.2 The economy 103
It can be veriﬁed that the Novikov condition holds indeed in our model,2 so the Bond-
Stock-Commodity economy is free of arbitrage. Moreover, this economy can be shown to




= −rdt − λ
⊤
t dZt, and ξ0 = 1. (5.10)
Now turn to an investor with initial wealth W0. Her consumption plan is characterized
by an consumption-rate process ct, and her portfolio plan is a process of portfolio weights
in the two risky assets xt =
 
xS,t xM,t
 ⊤, where xS,t and xM,t denote the portfolio
weights in the stock, St, and in the investable representative commodity, Mt, respectively.
The residual, 1 − xS,t − xM,t, is allocated to the riskless bond.
From the self-ﬁnancing property of the consumption-portfolio plan, it follows that the

















Note that given xM,t, we can calculate the corresponding holding of the underlying com-
modity futures contracts as follows. Recall that in one unit of the representative com-
modity Mt, the holding of the futures contract with constant time to maturity ℓ has a
notional value of Mte
  θℓ. When xM,t weight of total wealth is allocated to Mt, it implies
the ratio of the notional value of the underlying future contract to the wealth value Wt
is xM,te
  θℓ.





















where γ is the constant rate of relative risk aversion. For reasons that will become clear
later, γ is assumed to be larger than one throughout the chapter to ensure the existence
of a well-behaved solution. This assumption is empirically relevant as it is generally
2As λ1 is constant and hence satisﬁes the Novikov condition, we only have to verify that it is also
true for the Ornstein-Uhlenbeck λ2,t. Dokuchaev [2007] has proved that a market price of risk following
an Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process satisﬁes the Novikov condition. Following the same reasoning as in
Dokuchaev [2007], we can prove that this condition applies in our model.104 Commodities in Dynamic Asset Allocation
supported by empirical studies of people’s risk aversion (see e.g. Friend and Blume [1975],
Pindyck [1988], and Szpiro [1986]), and by the literature on the equity premium puzzle.
























where η denotes the subjective discount rate.
5.3 Pure portfolio optimization
I start with the terminal wealth case, in which there are only portfolio decisions to make.
Using the martingale method, the dynamic optimization problem (5.12) is equivalent to










s.t. W0 = E [ξTWT]
(5.14)
In particular, the budget constraint in (5.12) is equivalent to the static one in (5.14) that
is formulated in terms of the unique state price density. For a solution to this static






is ﬁnite [Cox and Huang, 1991],
namely the growth-optimal portfolio has a ﬁnite expectation. Under the assumption that





where k is a Lagrange multiplier determined by substituting the optimal terminal wealth
into the static budget constraint.


















dZt. (5.15)5.3 Pure portfolio optimization 105






















   λ2,t,Nt
 
,
where the last equality follows from the fact that λ2,t and Nt together form a strong
Markov process, and hence λ2,t and Nt are all the investor needs to know to evaluate
moments of NT at time t. Therefore, we can deﬁne
Wt := F(Nt,λ2,t,t;T).
5.3.1 Optimal wealth





























Then the optimal wealth can be presented as follows.
Lemma 5.3.1. For an investor concerned with maximizing the expected utility over wealth
at time T as described in (5.12), the optimal wealth is given by
Wt = F(Nt,λ2,t,t;T) = N
1
γ
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Proof. Given that Wt = F(Nt,λ2,t,t;T) and the stochastic diﬀerential equations (5.9)
and (5.15) for λ2,t and Nt, we can write the wealth process in the form of a stochastic
diﬀerential equation by applying Ito’s formula:





























































Because Wt is a self-ﬁnancing wealth process, no arbitrage requires
 W − rF = σWλt.







































Nt(ρλ1 + ¯ ρλ2,t) = rF. (5.21)




It is noteworthy that this PDE bears a close resemblance to the PDE for the optimal
wealth process in [Wachter, 2002, Eq. (20)], where the optimal portfolio choice problem
is addressed in the context of mean-reverting stock risk premia. The resemblance arises
from the fact that the market price of risk in Wachter’s model is characterized by an
Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process, as is λ2,t in the Bond-Stock-Commodity model.
The PDE can be solved by ﬁrst guessing a general form for the solution. Enlightened
by the solution to the PDE in Wachter [2002], I guess the form given by (5.17) and (5.18).
Substituting them back into (5.21) yields a quadratic equation for λ2,t; from the fact that
both the constant term and the coeﬃcients on λ2
2,t and λ2,t must be zero, one obtains a
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Equations of the same form appear in Kim and Omberg [1996] and Wachter [2002], and
the solution method is standard. Following Wachter [2002], I assume that γ > 1 to ensure
the existence of a well-behaved solution. Under this assumption, the solution is given by
(5.19).
For the validity of the optimal solution (5.17), some technical conditions need to
be satisﬁed [Cox and Huang, 1989]. Appendix 5.A veriﬁes that these conditions hold.
Therefore the optimal wealth is given by (5.17).
5.3.2 Optimal portfolio plan
Turn to the optimal portfolio plan, a plan that secures the optimal wealth. In the
martingale solution, the optimal portfolio plan can be obtained by equating the diﬀusion
terms in the two characterizations of the optimal wealth given by (5.11) and (5.20). So
the optimal strategy can be summarized as follows.
Theorem 5.3.2. For an investor facing the problem (5.12) in the Bond-Stock-Commodity





































¯ ρ [A1(T − t)λ2,t + A2(T − t)]
 
      
intertemporal part
. (5.23)
As is standard in the literature, the optimal strategy in the above presentation is
decomposed into two parts: a myopic part, and an intertemporal part. The myopic part,
independent of investment horizon, is the allocation that an investor would choose if she
ignored changes in the investment opportunity set or if her utility function is logarithmic.
The interpretation from the perspective of logarithmic utility can be seen directly by
setting γ to one: when γ is one, A1 and A2 are zero, and the second part disappears.
The intertemporal allocation, the concept of which was ﬁrst introduced by Merton [1971]
and repeated in many subsequent studies, depends on the investment horizon and stems
from stochastic variations in the investment opportunity set.
Let us look at the allocation to the two risky assets in more detail. Given the empirical
evidence presented in Section 5.5 that the risk premium in the commodity market is
decreasing in the spot commodity price, namely a signiﬁcantly negative estimate of β
in (5.4), it is assumed that β < 0 in the following discussion. The stock allocation,108 Commodities in Dynamic Asset Allocation
x∗
S,t, consists solely of a myopic part. It should not come as a surprise, considering that
the stochastic changes in the investment opportunity set in the Bond-Stock-Commodity
economy are caused by the variations of the commodity price as shown in (5.8), and
hence the commodity should be in a better position to deal with them. The stock




γσ1¯ ρλ2,t, has a natural economic
interpretation. The ﬁrst term,
λ1
γσ1, is the classical stock allocation in the Black-Scholes
economy [Merton, 1969]. The second term, −
ρ
γσ1¯ ρλ2,t, is more interesting for our purposes,
as it arises from the introduction of the commodity. Because of the relationship between
λ2,t and the commodity price as given in (5.4) and (5.8), the second term implies that
the stock allocation is dependent on the commodity price. And the dependence may
take three forms, according to the way the commodity and the stock covary with each
other: (i) when the stock price is positively correlated with the commodity price (ρ > 0),
the stock weight is increasing with the commodity price; (ii) when the stock price is
negatively correlated with the commodity price (ρ < 0), the stock weight is decreasing
with the commodity price; and (iii) when they are independent from each other (ρ = 0),
the stock weight is immune to the commodity price variation, and constant at
λ1
γσ1.
Diﬀerent from the case for the stock, the commodity allocation x∗
M,t is made both for
myopic purposes and for intertemporal purposes. First consider the myopic demand for
the commodity, λ2,t/γσ2¯ ρ. With β < 0, it is a decreasing function of the commodity
price, and the myopic demand requires to sell the commodity when its price rises, and
to buy when its price drops. This property follows from the fact that the instantaneous
expected return on the commodity is negatively related to the current commodity price.
Whether the investor should be long or short the commodity depends on the sign of λ2,t.









With β < 0, we can distinguish three cases: (i) when the commodity price is lower than
¯ Mmpc, and then λ2,t is positive, the myopic demand is a long position; (ii) when the
commodity price is greater than ¯ Mmpc, and then λ2,t is negative, the investor is short
the commodity; and (iii) when the commodity price is equal to ¯ Mmpc, and then λ2,t is
zero, the optimal policy dictates no exposure to the commodity for myopic purposes.
These are natural results if recalling that the myopic allocation is concerned only with
instantaneous returns of assets.5.3 Pure portfolio optimization 109
Figure 5.1: The dependence of the myopic allocation on the commodity price:
an illustration The ﬁgure shows the instantaneous mean-variance optimization for two diﬀerent
commodity price M1 and M2. The corresponding tangency portfolios are “P1” and “P2”.
Thus, the myopic demand both for the stock and for the commodity is dependent
on the commodity price. This dependence can be accounted for more intuitively by
analogy with mean-variance optimization. As is well known (see, for example, Chapter
13 in Ingersoll [1987]), optimal myopic allocation to risky assets, i.e. the portfolio of risky
assets optimally chosen by log investors, can be interpreted as the tangency portfolio
in the instantaneous standard deviation-expectation graph as illustrated in Figure 5.1.
In the Bond-Stock-Commodity economy, the expectation and variance of the return on
the stock is ﬁxed, so the stock is characterized by a ﬁxed point in the ﬁgure. However,
the expected return on the commodity is conditional on the current commodity price, so
the locus of the commodity in the standard deviation-expectation graph is time-varying.
Suppose that the spot commodity price is M1 at a certain time, a myopic investor would
ﬁnd the optimal allocation by looking for the tangency portfolio (labeled as “P1” in the
ﬁgure), a portfolio based on the ﬁxed locus of the stock and the current locus of the
commodity. If the spot commodity price changes to M2, say, and the commodity changes
to a corresponding new locus, then the corresponding new tangency portfolio (labeled as
“P2”) will be formed according to the “new” commodity. As such, the myopic allocation
changes with the variation of the commodity price.110 Commodities in Dynamic Asset Allocation
Now turn to the intertemporal demand for the commodity. From its expression
β
γ¯ ρ
[A1(T − t)λ2,t + A2(T − t)], (5.24)
it follows that the intertemporal demand changes with the spot commodity price, through
the presence of λ2,t, and with the investment horizon, through the presence of A1(T −t)
and A2(T −t). First look at the impact of the spot commodity price. Because β < 0 and
A1(τ) is negative (see Appendix 5.A), the intertemporal allocation is a decreasing function
of the commodity price. In other words, as in the myopic allocation to commodity, the
intertemporal allocation is to buy the commodity when its price falls, and to sell when
its price rises. By deﬁnition, the intertemporal allocation is concerned with returns on
assets beyond the next period (an inﬁnitesimal period in continuous time). For the mean-
reverting commodity, a price hike implies that not only the return on the commodity
over the next inﬁnitesimal period is getting worse3, but the returns beyond the next
period are deteriorating as well. And it calls for, as a response, lowering the exposure
to the commodity beyond what is done is the myopic allocation. Conversely, a price
slump implies improved prospects of future returns, and requires an increased exposure
in the intertemporal allocation. These observations may help to understand why the
intertemporal demand is decreasing in the commodity price.
Consider now the dependence of the intertemporal allocation on the investment hori-
zon. In particular, should a long-term investor allocate more to the commodity than a
short-term one? The horizon eﬀect of the intertemporal allocation to the commodity also
represents the entire horizon eﬀect of the total risky allocation, as it is the sole element





1(T − t)λ2,t + A
′
2(T − t)), (5.25)
which follows from diﬀerentiating (5.24) with respect to the horizon. As shown in Ap-
pendix 5.A, A′
1(τ) is negative, whereas A′
2(τ) can be positive or negative, depending on
the sign of λ∗, where λ∗, as deﬁned in (5.16), includes the parameters characterizing the
ﬁnancial market and the risk aversion of the investor. Thus, without imposing further
constraints on the parameter values, we cannot decide the sign of (5.25), or the horizon
eﬀect. Further discussion of horizon eﬀect will be given in the numerical example in
Section 5.5.
3This implication has been captured by the myopic allocation.5.3 Pure portfolio optimization 111
After looking into its two components, we are ready to consider the total commodity
allocation. First of all, the total commodity allocation is decreasing in the commodity
price since both components are decreasing in the price. Another question that one may
ask is when the investor should be long or short the commodity as a whole. To answer
this question, one can derive the following threshold commodity price for deciding the







σ2¯ ρA2(T − t)
1 + σ2βA1(T − t)
 
. (5.26)
Therefore, when the commodity price is lower, or higher than this threshold price, the
investor should be long, or short the commodity, respectively. The threshold ¯ Mttl depends
on the investment horizon, so it is possible that other things being equal, one investor is
short the commodity and another is long simply because they have diﬀerent investment
horizons. Unless λ∗ = 0, the threshold in the total commodity allocation, ¯ Mttl, is diﬀerent
from that in the myopic commodity allocation, ¯ Mmpc. This highlights the diﬀerence
between the dynamic framework and the static one: while a myopic investor would be
short the commodity, the optimal allocation may be a long position if intertemporal
rebalancing is allowed. This diﬀerence is attributed to the intertemporal allocation to











This threshold is diﬀerent from ¯ Mmpc unless λ∗ = 0, and it may be less or greater than
¯ Mmpc, depending on the sign of λ∗.
5.3.3 The importance of commodities as an asset class: welfare
analysis
For an emerging asset class like commodities, it is natural to ask how important it is
to take it into account when making investment decisions. In other words, how costly
is it if the new asset class is left out in investment decision-making? To address this
question, welfare analysis is applied, as is standard in the literature. In this chapter,
the importance of incorporating the new asset class, or the utility cost of omitting it, is
measured by the percentage extra initial wealth that is necessary to bring the investor
to the same expected utility as is obtained by following the optimal strategy. The utility
cost can be solved in closed form.112 Commodities in Dynamic Asset Allocation
Proposition 5.3.3. Suppose that in the Bond-Stock-Commodity economy, an investor
is concerned with maximizing the expected utility over wealth at time T as described in
(5.12). If the commodity is excluded in portfolio decisions, then L percent of extra initial
wealth is needed to achieve the same expected utility level as is obtained by following the




























Proof. First, we need to know the expected utility from the optimal strategy, namely the
indirect utility function. Cox and Huang [1989] show that the indirect utility function












t H(λ2,t,T − t)
γ.





t H(λ2,t,T − t)
γ.
Therefore, the boundary condition J(WT,λ2,T,T) = W
1−γ
T /(1−γ) implies that the indi-








When the commodity is left out, the Bond-Stock-Commodity economy is reduced































(5.28) follows immediately.5.4 Optimal portfolio and consumption decisions 113
The exponent in the right hand side of (5.28) is a quadratic function of the initial
commodity price. From the quadratic form, it follows that with either very high or
very low commodity prices, the welfare loss is relatively large, whereas with intermediate
commodity prices, the loss is relatively small. The eﬀect on the welfare loss of other
factors, like the investment horizon and the risk aversion of the investor, will be discussed
in the numerical illustrations in Section 5.5.
5.4 Optimal portfolio and consumption decisions
Now consider the case where the investor derives utility from intermediate consumption.
In this case, apart from deciding what asset mix to hold, the investor needs to decide
what fraction of wealth to consume. Thus, assuming utility over consumption allows
Merton’s problem to be related to people’s ﬁnancial decisions in a way that the previous
terminal wealth case does not. On the other hand, the intermediate-consumption case
has a close link with the terminal wealth case, in that the the single optimization problem
in the former case can be thought of as a series of optimization problems for a continuum
of future dates [Wachter, 2002]. In particular, the investor with utility over consumption
decides the optimal series of consumption events, and then applies the terminal wealth
analysis to each future consumption event. This is analogous to the equivalence between
a bond that pays coupon continuously and a continuum of zero-coupon bonds. In the
following martingale solution, I shall use this insight and follow a procedure similar to
Wachter [2002].
The martingale approach transforms the budget constraint in (5.13) into a static one,
W0 = E





The optimal consumption plan follows from the ﬁrst order condition of the optimization








where K is a Lagrange multiplier determined by inserting c⋆
t into (5.29).
The optimal portfolio plan is determined so as to meet the need to ﬁnance the con-
sumption plan (5.30). The wealth at time t, denoted by Wt, is the discounted value of
4Here we work under the same technical assumption that E(ξ
−1
T ) is ﬁnite as in the terminal wealth
case. The other technical conditions for the solution’s validity are proved in Appendix 5.A.114 Commodities in Dynamic Asset Allocation












As in the terminal wealth case, deﬁne a new variable
Nt = (Kξt)
−1 .
















That is, Nt has the same dynamics as Nt, but with a diﬀerent initial value. From the
introduction of Nt, and the strong Markov property of
 
Nt λ2,t
 ⊤, it follows that
Wt = NtE









   λ2,t,Nt
 
.
Therefore one can deﬁne
Wt := G(Nt,λ2,t,t;T).
5.4.1 Optimal wealth
The optimal wealth assuming interim consumption can be characterized as follows.
Lemma 5.4.1. For an investor concerned with maximizing the expected utility over life-
time consumption as described in (5.13), the optimal wealth is given by









H(λ2,t,s − t)ds, (5.32)
where















A3(τ) =A3(τ) − ητ5.4 Optimal portfolio and consumption decisions 115
Proof. Applying Ito’s formula to Wt = G(Nt,λ2,t,t;T), one has





























































Diﬀerent from the terminal wealth case, the portfolio process Wt is not self-ﬁnancing,
since a continuous consumption ﬂow c⋆
t is withdrawn. Thus G(Nt,λ2,t,t) itself does not
satisfy the generalized Black-Scholes equation. Instead, in this case no arbitrage requires
 W + c
⋆
t − rG = σWλt.













































γ t = rG, (5.36)
with the boundary condition,
G(NT,λ2,T,T) = 0.
Because a PDE of similar form has been solved by Wachter [2002], I take (5.32) and
(5.33) as the guessed form of solution here. Substituting them into (5.36) and matching
the coeﬃcients of λ2
2,t, λ2,t and the constant term produces a system of three diﬀerential
equations very similar to (5.22). And their solution is (5.34).
At ﬁrst glance, it seems hard to understand why the diﬀerential equation (5.36) should
have a solution in the integral form as in (5.32). This guessed solution, however, may
follow naturally when utilizing the link between the intermediate consumption analysis
and the terminal wealth analysis. Consider a series of auxiliary investors deriving utility
from terminal wealth at time i ∈ [0,T], and each investor is indexed by her ﬁxed horizon






















 . (5.37)116 Commodities in Dynamic Asset Allocation
Applying the terminal wealth analysis to investor i, we can write her optimal wealth at
t ∈ [0,i] as













With the introduction of F(Nt,λ2,t,t;i), the optimal wealth of the investor with utility






The terminal wealth analysis can yield a solution of F that is similar to F given by (5.17).
So the solution (5.32) follows immediately.
The derivation through a series of auxiliary investors has an interesting economic
interpretation. Wi,0 given in (5.37) is the value at time zero of the optimal terminal
wealth at time i. From (5.29) and (5.30), it follows that Wi,0 is the value at time zero
of the optimal consumption event at period i for the investor concerned with interme-
diate consumption. The fraction at the right hand side of (5.37) is the ratio of period-i
consumption to her life-time consumption in terms of the present value. Therefore, it is
correct to think of the investor as holding separate accounts for each future consumption
event, distributing her initial wealth into each account according to (5.37) to achieve
the optimal consumption plan, and then investing each account so that the consumption
needs are met.
5.4.2 Optimal portfolio and consumption policy
In the intermediate consumption case, the optimal ﬁnancial strategy is characterized by
the following theorem.
Theorem 5.4.2. Suppose that in the Bond-Stock-Commodity economy, an investor seeks
to maximize the expected utility over life-time consumption by choosing consumption and
investment plans, as formalized in (5.13). Then the optimal consumption plan can be
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intertemporal part
. (5.40)
Proof. The optimal consumption-wealth ratio follows from (5.30) and (5.32). The optimal
portfolio plan can be obtained by equating the diﬀusion terms in (5.11) and (5.35), the
two characterizations of Wt.
For the optimal consumption-wealth ratio, note that it changes with the commodity
price, but not with the stock price.
The myopic allocation in the portfolio plan is the same as that in the terminal wealth
case. It is a natural outcome when considering that in the analogy of the investor with
utility over consumption to a series of investors concerned with terminal wealth, each of
the auxiliary investors has identical myopic allocation.
The only new element arising from assuming intermediate consumption is contained in
the intertemporal allocation to the commodity. Comparing (5.40) and (5.23), it is clear
that the intertemporal allocation in the intermediate consumption case is a weighted









Hence, H(λ2,t,τ) can be interpreted as the time-t value of future consumption in τ periods
normalized by the optimal consumption rate at time-t. In all, the intertemporal allocation
assuming intermediate consumption is an average of those assuming terminal wealth, and
the average is weighted by the value of future consumption in each period.
5.4.3 Welfare analysis
When people are concerned with interim consumption, the utility loss of leaving out the
commodity is as follows.
Proposition 5.4.3. Suppose that in the Bond-Stock-Commodity economy, an investor
is concerned with maximizing the expected utility over life-time consumption as described
in (5.13). If the commodity is excluded in consumption and portfolio decisions, then L118 Commodities in Dynamic Asset Allocation
percent of extra initial wealth is needed to achieve the same expected utility level as is























Proof. By reasoning similar to that in the terminal wealth case, the indirect utility func-





























Then L as given by (5.41) follows from its deﬁnition.
5.5 Calibration and discussion
In this section, I shall ﬁrst estimate the commodity futures price model. Then some
representative numerical illustrations and discussions will be presented.
5.5.1 Estimation of the commodity futures model
The parameters that characterize the asset class of commodities are estimated using the
GSCI Commodities Index futures prices. The GSCI index underlying the futures contract
tracks the price levels of major commodities, and the futures contract can be viewed as
being written on a basket of commodities. Therefore, the GSCI Commodities Index is
taken to be the non-tradable spot commodity price, and the GSCI Commodities Index
futures prices are the tradable futures prices.
The estimation is carried out in two steps. In the ﬁrst, the three parameters that
characterize the spot commodity price, θ,  2, and σ2, are estimated. From (5.3), the
logarithm of the spot commodity price follows a ﬁrst-order autoregressive process, and the
maximum likelihood method is used to get the estimates (Table 5.1). I use the monthly
data of GSCI Commodity Index from December 1969, the start date of the index, to5.5 Calibration and discussion 119
November 2008. The data are deﬂated by the US CPI-U index, for the reason that the
asset prices are assumed to be measured in real terms in the Bond-Stock-Commodity
economy. The deﬂated data are normalized in such a way that the value was 100 in July
1992 when Chicago Mercantile Exchange (CME) introduced futures on this index.
The second step is to estimate α and β, which specify the risk premium in the futures
market (5.4). The futures price (5.5) can, in log form, be rewritten as
lnFt(T ) = e
−  θT mt + (1 − e
−  θT )







−2  θT ), (5.42)
where T is the time to maturity of the futures contract. From Ito’s formula and (5.3) it
follows










−  θT dZM,t. (5.43)
Inserting (5.42) into (5.43) leads to




























−2  θT dZM,t. (5.44)
From (5.44) it is clear that the futures price in log form with a constant time-to-maturity
T , lnFt(T ), also follows a ﬁrst-order autoregressive process, and the maximum likelihood
method can be used to estimate α and β (through estimating   θ and    ).
Data of the GSCI Commodities Index futures prices are used to estimate (5.44). In
view of the liquidity of futures contracts, the ﬁrst three nearby futures contracts are
used in the estimation. In particular, the data, obtained from Bloomberg, consist of the
monthly observations of the prices of these three contracts at the end of each month
from July 1992 to November 2008. Since the futures trading terminates on the eleventh
business day of the contract month, the time to maturity for each of these three contracts
does not change with the observations. As with the underlying index, the futures prices
are deﬂated by the CPI-U index, and normalized correspondingly.
The estimates of α and β are presented in Table 5.1. The estimate of β is signiﬁcantly
negative, suggesting that the risk premium of the commodity futures is decreasing in the
spot commodity price.
For the purpose of numerical illustration, I assume the other parameter values as
given in Table 5.1. The parameter values for the stock and the riskless bond,  1, σ1,
and r, are taken to be consistent with many empirical studies, e.g. Campbell [2003].120 Commodities in Dynamic Asset Allocation
The value of the correlation coeﬃcient is chosen to be -0.10, a level corresponding to the
ﬁnding in many studies that the commodity and stock returns have a moderate negative
correlation.
5.5.2 Optimal strategy and utility of commodity investment
For the parameter values as given in Table 5.1, optimal ﬁnancial strategies and utility
losses are determined. The focus of this numerical exercise is on the inﬂuence of the
commodity price, of the horizon of the investor, and of the risk aversion of the investor.
From the property of Ornstein-Uhlenbeck processes, it follows that the logarithm of com-











. To have an intuitive idea of the level of current commodity
price, I shall locate it with respect to this asymptotical distribution.
Figure 5.2 shows the optimal strategies and utility losses for a range of current com-
modity prices from 66 through 251. With respect to the asymptotically stationary distri-
bution of the commodity price, this commodity price range corresponds to the one from
the 5th-percentile to the 95th-percentile. For this range of commodity prices, the ex-
pected return on the representative portfolio of commodity futures varies from 9.42% to
−3.62%. In this example, the optimal stock weight is decreasing with the spot commod-
ity price, owing to the assumed negative correlation coeﬃcient between the two driving
Brownian motions, and the decreasing relationship between the risk premium in the com-
modity futures market and the spot commodity price. Notably, the commodity allocation
varies considerably with the changes of the commodity price. The commodity allocation
decreases from a long position of almost 70% for the commodity price at 5th-percentile,
to a short position of around 25% for the commodity price at 95th-percentile. In the
optimal portfolio strategy, there is substantial market timing.
We have learned that the utility losses of leaving out the commodity depend on the
Estimated parameter values Assumed parameter values
ˆ θ ˆ  2 ˆ σ2 ˆ α ˆ β  1 σ1 r ρ η
0.120 5.023 0.199 2.335 -0.465 0.080 0.150 0.010 -0.100 0.010
(0.082) (0.066) (0.012) (0.518) (0.186)
Table 5.1: The parameter values used for the numerical exercise The parameters
characterizing the asset class of commodities are estimated, and the standard errors are in parenthesis.
The other parameter values are taken to be consistent with many existing studies.5.5 Calibration and discussion 121
current commodity price (Propositions 5.3.3 and 5.4.3). In this numerical example, the
current commodity price has a signiﬁcant impact on the magnitude of utility loss. For
the given range of commodity price, the utility loss varies from 4% to 22% in the terminal
wealth case, and from 2% to 10% in the intermediate consumption case. It suggests that
excluding commodities in ﬁnancial decisions is much more costly when commodity prices
are very low or very high than when they are moderate.
Figure 5.3 shows that the utility loss of excluding the commodity is increasing in the
horizon, T, and decreasing in the degree of risk aversion, γ. The decreasing relation to the
degree of risk aversion is perhaps what one would expect, considering that risky assets,
including commodities, account for a lower portfolio weight for more risk averse people
as they would invest more in the riskless asset. The increasing relation to the horizon
also should come as no surprise if considering that a longer period of time enables one
to beneﬁt more from the additional investment opportunities brought by commodities.
These intuitions make it tempting to conjecture that these relations hold independent of












Panel A: the terminal wealth case





















Figure 5.2: Optimal policy and the commodity price This ﬁgure shows how the optimal
strategy and the utility loss changes with the current commodity price in the terminal wealth case (Panel
A), and in the intermediate consumption case (Panel B). It is assumed that T = 10, and γ = 5. The
stock allocation and the myopic allocation to the commodity are the same in both cases, and they are
not repeated in Panel B for ease of reading.122 Commodities in Dynamic Asset Allocation
the chosen parameter values.
Figure 5.3 also shows that other things being equal, excluding the commodity is
less costly in the intermediate consumption case than in the terminal wealth case. Other
things being equal, the utility cost of excluding the commodity is increasing in the horizon,
then a plausible explanation for the lower utility cost in the intermediate consumption
case could be that the “eﬀective” horizon of the investor assuming intermediate con-
sumption is shorter than that assuming terminal wealth. The aforementioned analogy to
coupon-bearing and zero-coupon bonds helps to understand the explanation. It is well
known that a coupon-bearing bond has a shorter eﬀective horizon than its zero-coupon
counterpart. By analogy, the investor assuming intermediate consumption should have
a shorter eﬀective horizon than her counterpart assuming terminal wealth, and hence
suﬀers a lower utility cost.
Figure 5.3: The eﬀect on utility loss of investment horizon and risk aversion
This ﬁgure shows how the utility loss changes with the investment horizon and the degree of risk aversion
in the terminal wealth case and the intermediate consumption case. The spot commodity price is assumed
to be 129, the median value of the asymptotic distribution.5.5 Calibration and discussion 123
The ﬁnding that the utility loss is decreasing in risk aversion is diﬀerent from that of
Anson [1999], who concludes that the more risk-averse the investor, the higher the utility
of investing in commodity futures. A plausible explanation of this diﬀerence lies in the
diﬀerent framework of analysis: Anson’s study is based on a one-period mean-variance
framework with only risky assets, while our conclusion comes from a dynamic framework
where the riskless asset is available. Anson [1999] shows that the allocation to commodity
futures is monotonically increasing with the degree of risk aversion. In comparison,
this numerical exercise shows the eﬀect of risk aversion on commodity allocation is not
monotonic (Figure 5.4). We can distinguish two cases: (i) when the spot commodity
price is relatively low, the commodity weight is decreasing with risk aversion; and (ii)
when the spot commodity price is relatively high, the commodity weight is increasing
with risk aversion.
Now turn to the intertemporal allocation to the commodity. Figure 5.5 shows how the















































































Figure 5.4: The eﬀect on the optimal commodity weight of the spot commodity
price and risk aversion This ﬁgure shows how the total commodity weight changes with the
spot commodity price and the degree of risk aversion in the terminal wealth case and the intermediate
consumption case. It is assumed that T = 10.124 Commodities in Dynamic Asset Allocation
of risk aversion. Two interesting points stand out from this ﬁgure: (i) in both terminal
wealth and intermediate consumption cases, the commodity allocation increases with the
horizon of the investor; and (ii) the investor with utility over terminal wealth allocates
more to the commodity than the investor concerned with intermediate consumption.
Actually, this ﬁgure illustrates the following proposition.
Proposition 5.5.1. If λ2,t and λ∗ are positive, then other things being equal, the optimal
commodity allocation increases with the horizon in both the terminal wealth case and the
intermediate consumption case. Moreover, the optimal intertemporal allocation to the
commodity is greater in the terminal wealth case than in the intermediate consumption
case.
Proof. When λ∗ is positive, then A1(τ), A2(τ) and their derivatives are all negative (see
Figure 5.5: The eﬀect of horizon and risk aversion on the intertemporal com-
modity allocation This ﬁgure shows how the intertemporal commodity allocation changes with
the horizon and the degree of risk aversion in the terminal wealth case and the intermediate consumption
case. The spot commodity price is assumed to be 129, the median value of the asymptotic distribution.5.6 Conclusion 125
Appendix 5.A). This implies that
−A1(T − t) > −
  T
t H(λ2,t,s − t)A1(s − t)ds
  T
t H(λ2,t,s − t)ds
−A2(T − t) > −
  T
t H(λ2,t,s − t)A2(s − t)ds
  T
t H(λ2,t,s − t)ds
.
From (5.23) and (5.40) and condition that λ2,t is positive, the statement about the in-
tertemporal allocation follows.
Note that given the parameter values and the current commodity prices used in Figure
5.5, λ∗ and λ2,t are positive.
In sharp contrast to the signiﬁcant utility of commodity investment in the dynamic
framework, the commodity market in this example is of little utility for a one-period
mean-variance investor. With these parameter values, the unconditional Sharpe ratio
in the commodity market, E[λM,t], is 7.6%. In comparison, the Sharpe ratio in the
stock market is 47%. Given an empirically reasonable value of the correlation coeﬃcient,
the allocation to and utility of the commodity investment in a mean-variance optimized
portfolio would be of little practical relevance. Therefore, investing in this asset class
makes little sense in the one-period mean-variance optimization framework. But under
the dynamic framework used in this study, commodity allocation may be needed in
considerable magnitude, and allocation to the asset class of commodities may yield a
consequential welfare improvement. The diﬀerence in the perception of the asset class of
commodities stems from the diﬀerence in the research frameworks.
The large utility of commodity investment illustrated in this example relies on exploit-
ing the return predictability in the commodity market. In this study, however, I abstract
from robustness issues, especially uncertainty about the predictive relationship, which
would aﬀect the optimal strategy and the utility improvement arising from commodity
investment. Further research is needed to address these issues.
5.6 Conclusion
Given the rapid growth of commodity markets as a major alternative asset class, this
study has aimed at examining this asset class in the framework of dynamic asset allocation
` a la Merton [1969]. In this study, the risk premium in the commodity market is assumed
to be time-varying and dependent on the non-tradable spot commodity price, while the126 Commodities in Dynamic Asset Allocation
spot commodity price has the property of mean reversion. This characterization of the
commodity market, an extended version of the single-factor model in Schwartz [1997], is
consistent with the empirical ﬁnding in this chapter that the spot commodity price has
signiﬁcantly negative eﬀect on the risk premium. As such, this study underscores the
implications for portfolio and consumption decisions of the time-varying risk premia of
commodity investment arising from the mean-reverting nature of commodity prices.
I have derived the optimal dynamic strategies for an investor who is concerned either
with terminal wealth or with intermediate consumption. Closed-form expressions were
obtained for the optimal strategies and the utility losses of excluding the commodity
in ﬁnancial decisions. In the optimal policy, the allocation to commodities is made for
myopic purposes, as well as for intertemporal hedging purposes. The optimal allocation
to the stock is solely myopic, and dependent on the spot commodity price.
Based on some representative parameter values, I presented a numerical example for
the optimal strategy and the utility cost of leaving out the commodity. In this example,
as long as the risk premium in the commodity market is positive, the optimal commodity
allocation has a horizon eﬀect—the longer horizon, the more allocation to the commodity.
The example also shows that if the investor is relatively less risk averse, and concerned
with ﬁnancial decisions over a longer time period, then the commodity market brings a
greater utility improvement. It suggests that in a long-term ﬁnancial plan, like that of
saving for retirement, it is rather costly to exclude commodities from ﬁnancial decision
making.
In this example, the signiﬁcant utility of commodity investment is established from
the dynamic perspective on ﬁnancial decisions, while an investor from the static mean-
variance perspective would ﬁnd little value in commodity investment. In the static
mean-variance framework, an appreciably positive risk premium in commodity markets
is needed for investors to include commodities in mainstream portfolios as an appeal-
ing asset class. When dynamic investment strategies are allowed, however, considerable
utility of commodity investment may come from exploiting the return predictability in
commodity markets.5.A Appendix 127
5.A Appendix
The portfolio strategy of the representative commodity portfolio
Mt
Applying Ito’s formula to the futures price (5.5) yields
dFt(T) = Ft(T)e
−  θ(T−t)σ2λM,tdt + Ft(T)e
−  θ(T−t)σ2dZM,t.
Consider a self-ﬁnancing portfolio Mt consisting of ψt units of the riskless bond and φt
units of the futures contract. Because the futures contract is constantly resettled to have
zero value and the portfolio is self-ﬁnancing, the portfolio Mt satisﬁes
Mt = ψtBt, and dMt = ψtdBt + φtdFt(T).
If the units of the futures contract φt = Mt
Ft(T)e
  θ(T−t), then
dMt = Mt (r + σ2λM,t)dt + Mtσ2dZM,t.
Note that the above equation only holds for t ≤ T. To overcome this restriction, we
can consider rolling over the futures contract. Namely, the holding of futures contract is
rolled over to keep the time to maturity of the held contract equal to a constant ℓ, and
the units of futures contract φt = Mt
Ft(T)e
  θℓ. Under this portfolio strategy, the notional
value of the futures holding is
φtFt(t + ℓ) = Mte
  θℓ.
Validity of the optimal policy
This appendix shows the validity of the optimal strategies that have been derived in the
terminal wealth case and in the interim consumption case. In addition to the assumption
that E(ξ
−1
T ) is ﬁnite, the following two conditions need to be veriﬁed [Cox and Huang,
1989, Theorem 2.2]: (i) the Lagrange multipliers k and K are positive and ﬁnite; and (ii)
F and G have suﬃcient continuous diﬀerentiability.
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It can be seen that ξT is positive. Moreover, because the right hand side is lognormal,
E[ξT] is bounded by the lognormal variable’s expectation, which is ﬁnite and a continuous


























Their positiveness follows immediately, and their ﬁniteness follows from Jensen’s inequal-
ity and the assumption that γ > 1.
Continuous diﬀerentiability of F and G From (5.17) and (5.32), the diﬀerentiabil-
ity condition holds inasmuch as A1(τ), A2(τ), A3(τ) and A3(τ) are continuously diﬀeren-
tiable. From (5.19) and (5.34), it follows that they are indeed continuously diﬀerentiable
(for the continuous diﬀerentiability of A1(τ) and A1(τ), see (5.45) below).
Properties of A1(τ) and A2(τ)
Deﬁne
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